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 Abstract 
 This article discusses the impact of the foreclosure crisis on the hous-
ing prospects of American families. Foreclosure is governed by state law, 
which establishes a procedure to enable lenders to recover property from 
defaulting borrowers through a public sale process. States authorize two 
different methods, judicial foreclosure, in which the foreclosure process re-
quires a judicial hearing, and power of sale foreclosure, in which a trustee 
can offer mortgaged property to the highest bidder at a public sale after 
giving twenty days public notice. Judicial foreclosure is administered by 
state courts in twenty-three states. The power of sale foreclosure process is 
administered by loan servicers through trustees in the other twenty-seven 
states. 
 Part I reviews the role that homeownership has played in American 
society and summarizes the history of federal support for homeowner-
ship. Part II examines the housing bubble of the early years of the new 
millennium and the foreclosure crisis that occurred when the bubble burst 
in 2008. Part II also examines the roles played by residential mortgage 
servicing companies that collect and distribute mortgage payments, as 
well as the role of the computerized mortgages tracking system operated 
by Mortgage Electronic Registration Services Inc. (MERS) as it interacts 
with the public land recording system as a nominee for lenders. Part III 
discusses governmental responses to the foreclosure crisis, including the 
HOPE NOW Alliance, the FHA HOPE for Homeowners (H4H) program 
established by the Bush administration, along with the Obama admin-
istration’s Housing Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and the 
Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program. Part IV ar-
gues that current foreclosure response techniques such as counseling and 
mediation can be successful if they become automatic parts of the residen-
tial mortgage foreclosure process, are coupled with mandatory loss miti-
gation requirements for lenders along the lines of the National Mortgage 
Settlement, and have as a resource a financing cushion for qualified de-
faulting homeowners, such as a “first priority ‘seed lien’ ” recommended 
by Professor Christopher Peterson of the University of Utah, S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. Part IV also recommends that greater attention be paid to 
the value of renting as a means of restoring stability to the overall housing 
market. 
Introduction
 Housing is both a product and a process. . . . Its primary functions are three: 
to provide (1) comfortable shelter; (2) a proper setting . . . for the day-to-day 
activities of families and households . . . ; and (3) the locus or location of 
families and other groups within the larger physical pattern of the locality.–
 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS (DOUGLAS COMMISSION) (1969) 
 “We are engaged in hand to hand combat,” asserted Linda Ingram, 
director of foreclosure intervention services at Beyond Housing Inc. in 
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St. Louis, describing the foreclosure crisis from the street. “Each loan ser-
vicer approaches these cases differently, so our focus must be on one family 
at a time.” 1
 For generations, homeownership has been a cherished goal of the Ameri-
can people and a major policy objective of the federal government. 2 During the 
1990s and into the early years of the new millennium, the housing sector was 
one of the strongest parts of the U.S. economy. A federal  government-backed 
homeownership initiative triggered a short-lived optimism that virtually 
anyone who wished to could own a home. 3 Property  values soared, creat-
ing a mindset focused on “How much can I borrow?” rather than the wiser 
question, “How much can I afford to pay back?” 4 By 2004, a record 69 percent 
of American households owned their own homes. 5 More new single-family 
homes were built in 2002 than in any year since 1978. 6
 1. Interview with Linda Ingram, Dir., Foreclosure Intervention Servs., Beyond 
Hous. Inc., St. Louis, Mo. (Nov. 23, 2010). 
 2.  See, e.g. , David Streitfeld & Megan Thee-Brenan,  Despite Fears, Own-
ing Home Retains Allure, Poll Shows ,  N.Y. TIMES , June 30, 2011, at D1 (reporting 
that “[n]early nine in ten Americans say homeownership is an important part of 
the American dream”). For analyses of homeownership questioning the com-
monly held beliefs in its value, see Kristen D. Adams,  Homeownership: American 
Dream or Illusion of Empowerment? , 60  S.C. L. REV. 573 (2009); Stephanie M. Stern, 
Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership , 100  COLUM. L. REV. 101 (2011). 
 3. American Dream Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 108-186, §§ 101–02, 117 Stat. 
2685 (codifi ed at 42 U.S.C. § 12821 (2003)) (authorizing grants to states and munici-
palities to enable them to provide downpayment assistance to low-income fi rst-time 
home buyers, not to exceed the greater of “(i) 6 percent of the purchase price of a 
single family housing unit; or (ii) $10,000”). Congress fi rst began mandating annual 
affordable housing goals for the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or 
Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Fred-
die Mac) in 1992. Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act 
of 1992, Title XIII, Subtitle A, Part 2, Subpart B, Pub. L. No. 102-550, §§ 1331–38, 106 
Stat. 3941, 3956–64 (codifi ed at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4561–67) (establishing the goal require-
ments and requiring HUD to promulgate them and report annually on progress 
toward meeting those goals). 
 4. The late Terry McCormack, an engineer and cofounder of McCormack Baron 
Salazar Inc. (MBS), one of the largest developers of affordable housing in the coun-
try, emphasized this question in his analyses of failed 1960s-era nonprofi t housing 
developments as a guest speaker in a housing law seminar I taught in the late 1970s. 
From those analyses, he and Richard Baron developed the strategy and business 
model that proved so successful for MBS.  McCormack Baron Salazar Community De-
velopment, Urban Revitalization History ,  MCCORMACK BARON SALAZAR , http://www.
mccormackbaron.com/about/history (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
 5.  JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION ’ S HOUS-
ING 2011 , at 17 (2011). 
 6.  JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION ’ S HOUS-
ING 2003, at 1, 6 (2003). 
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 Annual affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were the backbone of the 
secondary mortgage market, were increased from 52 percent to 56 percent 
of the two agencies’ total mortgage portfolios to “meet the then-existing un-
addressed needs” of low-income and very low-income families during the 
2005–2008 period. 7 To help meet these goals, the two agencies purchased 
over $400 billion in subprime 8 mortgage-backed securities 9 between 2004 and 
2006, a practice that later was deemed “a mistake” by former Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) officials. 10 When home values 
began dropping in 2005 and 2006, many of these borrowers found they were 
holding loan obligations that were larger than the value of their property, 
leading to the phenomenon of “being underwater.” 11 The deepening reces-
sion, triggered by the collapse of the housing bubble and exacerbated by a 
sharp rise in unemployment in 2008 and 2009, only made matters worse. 
 Following the housing market collapse, homeownership declined 
sharply, falling 2.1 percent between 2004 (the peak year) and 2010 to a level 
0.5 percent below the rate at the beginning of the decade. 12 At the end of 
2010, homeowner households were down 805,000 from 2006, while rent-
ers had grown by 3.9 million since 2004. 13 New single-family home con-
struction in 2010 “sank to lows last seen in the midst of World War II.” 14
  7. Peter W. Salsich, Jr.,  National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Legislation: The 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis Also Hits Renters , 16  GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL ’ Y 11, 32 
(2009) (quot ing 12 U.S.C. § 4563 and citing 24 C.F.R. §§ 81.12–.22 (2005)). The term 
“ government-sponsored enterprise” was coined to denote the fact that the two agen-
cies are corporations chartered by the federal government but owned by private 
investors who hold stock in the entities. 
  8. Subprime mortgages secure residential loans to borrowers with lower in-
comes or poor credit ratings, thus having a greater risk of defaulting. Such loans 
usually feature high interest rates and fees to protect lenders from the greater de-
fault risk.  See Amy Crew Cutts & Robert Van Order,  On the Economics of Subprime 
Lending 10 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 04-01, Jan. 2004). 
 9. Mortgage-backed securities are fractional shares of pools of mortgages that 
have been accumulated by intermediaries and then sold to investors. Salsich,  supra
note 7, at 28 (citing David Alan Richards, “ Gradable and Tradable ” : The Securitization 
of Commercial Real Estate Mortgages , 16  REAL EST. L.J. 99, 102 (1987)). 
 10.  Salsich, supra note 7, at 32.
 11. Bob Tedeschi,  Lifelines for Those “ Underwater ,”  N.Y. TIMES , July 24, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/realestate/26mort.html. 
 12.  JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION ’ S
HOUSING 2011, at 17 (2011). “The drop from the peak is the largest posted in annual 
records dating back to 1960. . . .”  Id . 
 13.  Id . 
 14.  Id . at 6. The homeownership rate kept falling in 2011, dropping to 65.9 per-
cent in the second quarter, a percentage not seen since the fi rst quarter of 1998. 
Carrie Bay,  Homeownership Rate Drops to 13-Year Low ,  DSNEWS.COM (Aug. 1, 2011), 
retrieved from http://www.dsnews.com/articles/print-view/homeownership-rate-
drops-to-13-year-low-2011-08-01 (citing U.S. Census Bureau News, Residential Va-
cancies and Homeownership in the Second Quarter 2011, CB11-124 ( July 29, 2011)). 
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Foreclosures spiked in 2008 and kept rising through 2011. The Center for 
Responsible Lending (CRL) reported in November 2011 that “2.7 million 
homeowners [had] lost their homes to foreclosure” and another “3.6 mil-
lion [were] at serious risk of losing their homes.” 15
 When the foreclosure volume spiked, both the courts and the servicers 
were overwhelmed. 16 Allegations of sloppy recordkeeping, negligence, and 
even fraud proliferated, with so-called robo-signing of thousands of docu-
ments by one person becoming the poster child for a deepening scandal. 17
Amid claims that banks short-changed the servicing side of their residential 
mortgage business, 18 and that the computerized mortgages tracking system 
operated by Mortgage Electronic Registration Services Inc. (MERS), a north-
ern Virginia-based company, was effectively hiding the identity of mortgage 
holders so that traditional public land records were not yielding true pictures 
of residential land titles, 19 attorneys general in all fifty states announced a 
 15.  DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, WEI LI & CAROLINA REID, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING & ROBERTO G. QUERCIA, CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, LOST GROUND, 2011: DIS-
PARITIES IN MORTGAGE LENDING AND FORECLOSURES 14 (2011),  available at http://www. 
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/lost-ground-2011.
html. An earlier report estimated that “between 10 and 13 million foreclosures [may] 
have occurred by the time the crisis abates.”  SARA WEED & SONIA GARRISON, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FORECLOSURE AS A LAST RESORT: STATES CAN STABILIZE THE HOUSING
MARKET BY PREVENTING UNNECESSARY FORECLOSURES 1 (2010),  available at http://www.
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/states/foreclosure-
as-a-last-resort.html (citing  DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, WEI LI & KEITH S. ERNST, CTR. 
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FORECLOSURES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A
CRISIS 3 (2010),  available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/
research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf;  JAN HATZIUS & MICHAEL A. 
MARSCHOUN, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL ECS RESEARCH, HOME PRICES AND CREDIT LOSSES: 
PROJECTIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS (2009)). 
 16.  See, e.g. , Joseph R. Fortunato & Steven B. Bashaw,  The Foreclosure Explosion: 
How Illinois Courts Are Responding , 98  ILL. B.J. 380 (2010) (“Courts in the Chicago 
metro area are drowning in a sea of foreclosures.”). 
 17. Robo-signing refers to the practice of lenders signing off on foreclosure af-
fi davits in such mass numbers without the specifi c knowledge and facts of each case 
that is required before approval of the foreclosure. Andrew Martin,  GMAC Mortgage 
Expands Review of Its Foreclosures ,  N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 12, 2010, at B9. 
 18. Eric Dash & Nelson D. Schwartz,  Bankers Ignored Signs of Trouble on Foreclo-
sures ,  N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at B1; Jim Puzzanghera,  The Mortgage Meltdown; FDIC 
Chief: Red Flags Were Missed; Bank Regulators Begin Their Own Probe of Problems with 
Home Seizure Procedures , L.A.  TIMES , Oct. 26, 2010, at B1 (quoting Sheila Bair, then 
chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, that fees charged by mortgage 
servicers had declined signifi cantly in recent years, something that should have 
raised questions about “how servicers were able to achieve such effi ciencies without 
sacrifi cing quality”). 
 19. For a comprehensive analysis of the role that MERS has been playing in the 
residential real estate market, see Christopher L. Peterson,  Foreclosure, Subprime 
Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System , 78  U. CIN. L. REV. 
1359 (2010). 
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joint investigation of foreclosure practices in October 2010. This ultimately 
led to a $25 billion settlement with five major banks, Ally Financial, Bank 
of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo, in March 2012. 20
 This article discusses the impact of the foreclosure crisis on the housing 
prospects of American families and takes a critical look at both current and 
proposed responses to the foreclosure crisis. The foreclosure crisis reminds 
us that not all can afford the responsibilities of homeownership at every 
stage of their lives and that rental housing can and does provide a valuable 
resource to all income levels. Part I reviews the role that homeownership 
has played in American society and summarizes the history of federal sup-
port for homeownership. Part II examines the housing bubble of the early 
years of the new millennium and the foreclosure crisis that occurred when 
the bubble burst in 2008. The roles played by residential mortgage servic-
ing companies that collect and distribute mortgage payments, as well as 
the role of MERS as it interacts with the public land recording system as 
a nominee for lenders, also are examined. Part III discusses governmental 
 20. The fi nal settlement, accepted by forty-nine states (Oklahoma did not partici-
pate) and the Obama administration, was announced on February 9, 2012, and fi led 
as fi ve separate consent judgments on March 12 in U.S. district court in Washington, 
D.C.  See, e.g. , Consent Judgment, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-
00361-RMC (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2012),  available at http://www.nationalmortgagesettle
ment.com/about (follow “Bank of America Consent Judgment” hyperlink); Andrew 
Martin,  All 50 States Start Inquiry into Foreclosures ,  N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 14, 2010, at B1; 
Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan,  Mortgage Plan Gives Homeowners Bulk of the 
Benefi ts ,  N.Y. TIMES , Feb. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/business/
states-negotiate-26-billion-agreement-for-homeowners.html?pagewanted=all; Nick 
Timiraos, Dan Fitzpatrick & Ruth Simon,  Accord Near on Foreclosure Abuses Deal, To-
taling as Much as $26 Billion with Five Banks, Would Settle Federal, State Probes of Lenders , 
 WALL ST. J. , Feb. 9, 2012, at C1. The settlement allocates $20 billion for borrower relief 
activities, including $10 billion for principal reduction for “borrowers who, as of the 
date of the settlement, owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth and 
are either delinquent or at imminent risk of default,” and $3 billion toward refi nanc-
ing efforts for “borrowers who are current on their mortgages but who owe more 
on their mortgages than their homes are worth.”  Fact Sheet: Mortgage Servicing Settle-
ment ,  NAT ’ L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT ,  retrieved from https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.
net/Mortgage_Servicing_Settlement_Fact_Sheet.pdf (Apr. 15, 2012). States will re-
ceive $2.5 billion in direct payments, with the bulk of those funds expected to be 
used to support foreclosure prevention, antifraud enforcement, legal assistance to 
homeowners, housing counseling, consumer education, and foreclosure mediation. 
Amanda Roberts,  Policy Post — How Will States Use Their $2.5 billion? ,  @THE HORIZON
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://enterprisecommunity.typepad.com/enterprise/2012/03/
policy-post-how-are-states-using-their-25-billion.html (an Enterprise blog about af-
fordable housing and community development). As the settlement talks came to 
a conclusion, forgery charges were fi led against a Missouri fi rm, Doc X, which al-
legedly engaged in a massive robo-signing practice. Gretchen Morgenson,  Company 
Faces Forgery Charges in Mo. Foreclosures , N.Y.  TIMES , Feb. 7, 2012, at B1. An audit in
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responses to the foreclosure crisis, including the HOPE NOW Alliance, the 
FHA HOPE for Homeowners (H4H) program established by the Bush ad-
ministration, together with the Obama administration’s Housing Afford-
able Modification Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable Foreclosure 
Alternatives (HAFA) program. Part IV argues that current foreclosure re-
sponse techniques such as counseling and mediation can be successful if 
they become automatic parts of the residential mortgage foreclosure pro-
cess; they are coupled with mandatory loss mitigation requirements for 
lenders; and a cushion for qualified defaulting homeowners, such as the 
“first priority ‘seed lien’ ” recommended by Professor Christopher Peter-
son of the University of Utah’s S.J. Quinney College of Law, is established. 
Part IV also recommends that greater attention be paid to the value of rent-
ing as a means of restoring stability to the overall housing market. 
 I. The American Dream 
 A. Homeownership—Boom and Bust 
 That old cliché, the American dream home, pictures housing as a brick or 
frame house, surrounded by green grass, ornamental shrubs, a white picket 
fence, and nestled among stately elms and oaks along a traffic-free lane. 
Ownership of one’s home long has been a cherished value and symbol of 
success in America. Generations of American families have pursued the ho-
meownership dream successfully, albeit in a variety of housing styles and 
sizes. But the collapse of the housing market in 2008 delivered an unsettling 
wake-up call. Perhaps homeownership was not all that it was said to be. 21
 When the housing bubble burst in 2008, homeownership dreams for 
millions of Americans evaporated. The stresses produced by a severe eco-
nomic downturn, a sudden loss of access to credit, and a precipitous drop 
in residential property values helped ignite a foreclosure firestorm that 
consumed the dreams of rich and poor alike. 22 Housing had been asked to 
San Francisco documented numerous instances of suspicious documentation and 
failure to follow legal standards. Gretchen Morgenson,  Audit Uncovers Extensive 
Flaws in Foreclosures , N.Y.  TIMES , Feb. 16, 2012, at A1. 
 21. “I wanted the white picket fence.” Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O’Byrne,  Burn-
ing Down the House: Law, Emotion, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis , 45  REAL PROP. 
TR. & EST. L .J. 677, 692 (2011) (quoting Abby Aquirre,  The Wrong Mortgage Derails 
a Mother’s Plans ,  N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 9, 2008, at A47 (describing the plight of a single 
mother who accepted a subprime, adjustable rate mortgage way beyond her means 
and was left penniless following two subsequent refi nancings and a short sale)). 
Robert Shiller, coauthor of the  Case-Shiller Report , attributed the housing bubble and 
its subsequent collapse to “pervasive optimism and complacency.” Robert J. Shiller, 
The Sickness Beneath the Slump ,  N.Y. TIMES , June 12, 2011, at BU6. 
 22. Linda Ingram,  supra note 1, in describing her work, included the example 
of a client in a wealthy suburb of St. Louis who had exhausted virtually all of his 
savings and retirement funds attempting to save his home that carried a monthly 
mortgage payment of several thousand dollars. 
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do too much by all sectors of the market. The resulting collapse left millions 
of homeowners facing foreclosure, countless others holding mortgages far 
larger than the market value of the properties to which they were attached, 
and a new breed of foreclosure counselors across the country striving to 
save as many families as possible from loss of their homes. 23 Millions of 
foreclosures helped produce a huge oversupply of houses, 24 as depressed 
housing prices fell 33 percent from the beginning of the market collapse 
in 2006 to the first quarter of 2011, a pace greater than the 31 percent drop 
during the Great Depression. 25 Recovery would take years. 26
 The collapse made clear that several fundamental shifts had taken place 
during the run-up to the 2008 catastrophe: 
 • Homeowners had shifted from treating a house as a place of shelter 
and family activities to treating it as an investment; 
 • Borrowers had shifted from asking the question, “how much can I af-
ford to pay back?” to asking, “how much will you lend me?”; 
 • Lenders had shifted from considering a home loan as a type of fixed-
rate bond (thirty year, fixed rate, level payment, first mortgage loan) 
to considering it as a type of preferred stock (five year, variable rate, 
interest-only first or second mortgage loan); and 
 23. Lender Processing Services (LPS), a mortgage and real estate data services 
provider, estimated that approximately 6.4 million mortgages were thirty or more 
days delinquent or in foreclosure, with approximately 2.2 million of those in 
foreclosure in April 2011.  LPS “ First Look ”  Mortgage Report: April Month-End Data 
Shows an Increase in Delinquency Rate and Drop in Foreclosure Inventories ,  LENDER
PROCESSING SERVICES (May 17, 2011), http://www.lpsvcs.com/LPSCorporateIn
formation/NewsRoom/Pages/20110517a.aspx. Nine months later, the numbers 
had declined, but only slightly. Carrie Bay,  Overdue Mortgages Number 6,082,000 , 
 DSNEWS.COM (Feb. 21, 2012), http:www.dsnews.com/articles/overdue-mortgages- 
number-6082000-2012-02-21. 
 24. Carrie Bay,  Inventory Overhang Means 6.5M New Households Needed , DS NEWS.
COM ( June 16, 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/inventory-overhang-means-
65m-new-households-needed-2011-06-16. 
 25. Jeff Cox,  US Housing Crisis Is Now Worse Than Great Depression , CNBC ( June 14, 
2011), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43395857. According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home 
Price Indices, residential real estate prices peaked in the second quarter of 2006 at 
189.93, with 100.00 being the price level in 2000, then dropped precipitously to a level of 
125.41 in the fi rst quarter of 2011.  S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices ,  STANDARD & POOR ’ S
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/
us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff—p-us——(last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
 26. One economist, using Census vacancy data and housing occupation trends, 
believes recovery will require “an average of 1.3 million new household forma-
tions per year for the next fi ve years.” Bay,  supra note 24. But household formations 
dropped sharply during 2007–10 to an annual average of less than one million new 
households.  JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION ’ S
HOUSING 2011 , at 12 (2011). 
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 • Investors had shifted from considering a residential mortgage as a 
loan of money to a purchase or sale of a fractional interest in a prom-
ise to pay (mortgage-backed securities bought and sold on the sec-
ondary and tertiary markets). 27
 The housing market collapse exposed the inherent risks of such shifts 
and the fact that none of the actors, including consumers (buyers, borrow-
ers, and sellers), lenders, investors, regulators, or servicers, was prepared 
to respond effectively to the collapse. 
 B. Federal Support for Homeownership: A Brief History 
 During the first half of the twentieth century, ownership and rental of 
housing was split about fifty-fifty among American households. The pent 
up demand created by returning GIs after World War II, coupled with 
strong encouragement of homeownership by government authorities, led 
to a surge in single-family housing construction and sale from the late 1940s 
into the 1970s. From 1945 to 1975, homeownership increased by about 50 
percent so that about two-thirds of American households owned their own 
homes in 1975. 28 During the last quarter of the twentieth century, home-
ownership continued to increase but at a much slower rate so that by 2000, 
slightly more than 67 percent of households owned their own homes. 29
 The provision of housing for American households traditionally has 
been considered the province of the private sector 30 and for a long time 
was carried out by a particularly localized industry. However, beginning 
in the 1930s as a response to the Great Depression, Congress began a con-
tinuing focus on housing as a social and economic force of national sig-
nificance. Landmark legislation was enacted over a five-year period in the 
1930s that created the mortgage insurance program administered by the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA); 31 the secondary mortgage market 
 27. For trenchant analyses of the housing meltdown, see  MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG
SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010);  GRETCHEN MORGENSON & JOSHUA ROSNER, 
RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT: HOW OUTSIZED AMBITION, GREED, AND CORRUPTION LED TO ECO-
NOMIC ARMAGEDDON (2011). 
 28.  GEORGE STERNLIEB & ROBERT BURCHELL, MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEMAND: 1975 –
 2000, at 2–3 (GPO 1978). 
 29.  JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION ’ S HOUS-
ING 2010, at 18, fi g.18 (2010); Heather K. Way,  Informal Homeownership in the United 
States and the Law ,  29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 126 (2009) ( citing  U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY/HOUSING VACANCY SURVEY tbl.14 (2008), http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr208/q208tab5.html). 
 30. This short discussion of federal housing programs is drawn from Peter W. 
Salsich, Jr.,  A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal Be Met? , 71 N.C. L. 
 REV ., 1619, 1621–22 (1993); and  Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long 
History of Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing , 42  WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 478 
(2007). Permission to use is gratefully acknowledged. 
 31. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (codifi ed as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701–50 (2006)). 
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programs administered by the Federal National Mortgage Administration 
(Fannie Mae); 32 and the low-rent housing program administered by the 
Public Housing Administration (PHA), a subdivision of the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency (HHFA), later HUD. 33
 After the Second World War, dramatic changes in demand occasioned 
by returning veterans, the baby boom, and the explosive growth of the sub-
urbs changed the emphasis on housing from multifamily and townhouse 
units in cities to tracts of single- family housing in the suburbs. This was ac-
complished in large part through the assistance of the mortgage insurance 
program administered by the FHA; the loan guarantee program adminis-
tered by the Veterans Administration; 34 the rural loan and guarantee pro-
grams of the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA); 35 and the secondary 
mortgage market programs of Fannie Mae, buttressed by the Government 
National Mortgage Agency (Ginnie Mae) in 1968 36 and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) in 1970. 37
 The key tradeoff, which changed the face of residential mortgage fi-
nance, was the federal requirement that participating lenders offer fully 
amortizing loans with level monthly payments, fixed interest rates, and 
low down payments. 38 Lenders were willing to comply with these condi-
tions because of the confidence generated by the mortgage insurance and 
guarantee programs and the creation of the secondary market to purchase 
the loans. 39
 But while the government’s mortgage loan insurance and guarantee 
programs made home loans affordable for millions of Americans, decisions 
by government agencies administering the programs made it extremely 
difficult for nonwhites to take advantage of these programs, particularly 
in the suburbs developed after World War II. 40 For example, the FHA, in its 
administration of the mortgage insurance program, used a neighborhood 
rating system devised by the short-lived Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
 32. National Housing Act Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-424, 52 Stat. 23, 
23, 24 (codifi ed as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006)). 
 33. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006). 
 34. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Title III, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 
284, 291 (codifi ed as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 3701–08 (2006)). 
 35. Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-210, 50 Stat. 522 
(codifi ed as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1922–2009ee (2006)). 
 36. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 
82 Stat. 476, 536 (codifi ed as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716b–17 (2006)). 
 37. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act of 1970, Title III, Pub. L. No. 
91-351, 84 Stat. 451 (codifi ed as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451–59 (2006)). 
 38.  PRESIDENT ’ S COMM ’ N ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 55 (1968). 
 39.  Id . at 55–56. 
 40. Adam Gordon,  The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in 
Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out 
of Reach for Blacks , 115  YALE L.J. 186, 213 (2005). 
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(HOLC) to establish criteria for insuring loans based on the notion that 
neighborhood stability required “that properties . . . continue to be occu-
pied by the same social and racial classes.” 41 This, coupled with the FHA’s 
sanction of racially restrictive covenants, effectively denied nonwhites 
the opportunity to purchase homes in the newly developing suburbs 
that featured single-family protective Euclidean zoning. 42 The combina-
tion of Commerce Department–marketed single-family zoning and FHA-
influenced home mortgage practices tilted single-family homeownership 
strongly toward whites and away from nonwhites, something that would 
not necessarily have happened without these governmental actions. 43
 II. Housing Collapse 
 A. Home Prices and Sizes Escalate 
 In the closing decades of the twentieth century, single-family home size 
and cost increased substantially, then ballooned in the first years of the 
twenty-first century. In 2000, the median size of a new home was 2,000 
square feet, and it cost approximately $200,000. Mortgages peaked in 2003 
at a record 13.6 million totaling $3.7 trillion, and Wall Street’s issuance of 
mortgage-backed securities also peaked that year at $463 billion. 44 By 2004, 
the Census Bureau reported that the median price had increased by 31 per-
cent to $262,000. 45 As a result, “many [homeowners] rushed to refinance 
their mortgages, extracting some of the bounty to buy a vacation home, go 
on a cruise, remodel the kitchen, or send the kids to college.” 46
 41.  Id . at 207–08 (citing  KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 208 (1985)). 
 42. The term Euclidean zoning comes from the Supreme Court decision up-
holding the comprehensive zoning technique that separates single-family detached 
housing from other forms of permissible land use against constitutional challenge. 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 43. Gordon makes the points that the HOLC did not use its rating index as a 
major factor when it refi nanced previously defaulted home loans in the early years 
of the Great Depression and that housing segregation was not a serious problem for 
blacks in the early years of the twentieth century. Gordon,  supra note 40, at 207–08. 
The term “redlining,” which became so controversial in the 1960s and 1970s,  see, e.g. , 
Jean Pogge,  Reinvestment in Chicago Neighborhoods: A Twenty-Year Struggle, in  FROM
REDLINING TO REINVESTMENT: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO URBAN DISINVESTMENT 133 (Greg-
ory D. Squires ed., 1992), was based on the fact that HOLC’s color-coded neighbor-
hood rating maps used the color red to identify the neighborhoods that had been 
given the lowest quality rating of “D,” including predominantly black neighbor-
hoods. Gordon,  supra note 40, at 207. 
 44.  MORGENSON & ROSNER ,  supra note 27, at 272;  Median and Average Sales Prices of 
New Homes Sold in United States ,  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU , 10, http://www.census.gov/
construction/nrs/pdf/uspricemon.pdf (last updated Mar. 23, 2012). 
 45.  Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes Sold in United States, supra note 
44, at 11. 
 46.  MORGENSON & ROSNER ,  supra note 27, at 219. 
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 As average home sizes increased, extremely large new homes of 3,000 
square feet or more almost doubled. 47 The housing bubble was fueled by 
steadily rising property values, which enabled middle- and upper-income 
households to obtain larger loans in order to buy larger homes, includ-
ing the so-called McMansions that dotted the landscape of suburbia in in-
creasing numbers. 48 When home values began dropping in 2007, many of 
these borrowers found they were holding loan obligations that were larger 
than the value of their property, leading to the phenomenon of “being 
underwater.” 49
 But despite the overall strength of the housing sector during the 
boom years, some disturbing trends were present. While more than 70 
percent of white households owned their own homes in 1999, less than 
50 percent of minority families did. An even larger gap existed between 
homeownership rates for lower-income households and higher-income 
households. 50 The Joint Center for Housing Studies reported that after 
ten years of substantial gains in homeownership rates for low-income 
households, homeownership rates for that cohort “fell almost twice 
as much as those for higher-income households on a percentage-point 
basis” from 2005–2009. 51 An increasing number of full-time workers, 
not to mention unemployed or part-time workers, could not afford to 
purchase a home. Fully employed people making minimum wage could 
not afford rental housing without substantial governmental assistance. 
Homelessness remained a serious problem for individuals and families, 
even those with jobs. 
 47. Jack L. Nasar, Jennifer S. Evans-Cowley & Vicente Mantero,  McMansions: The 
Extent and Regulation of Super-Sized Houses , 12 J.  URB. DESIGN 339, 340 (2007). 
 48. The term “McMansion” was coined to dramatize the substantial increase in 
the size of many American homes, particularly new homes that were built “in ex-
isting smaller house neighborhoods and on greenfi eld plats.”  Id . McMansions be-
came the culmination of a long period of house-size growth “from an average of 
983 square feet in the 1950s up to 2,300 square feet in the 2000s, despite declining 
household sizes.” Kaid Benfi eld,  Have Americans Given Up on McMansions? ,  ATLAN-
TIC CITIES (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/housing/2012/02/have-
americans-given-mcmansions/1184/. 
 49. Both median and average prices peaked in March 2007 at $262,600 and 
$329,400, respectively.  Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes Sold in United 
States, supra note 44, at 11. A loan is said to “be underwater” when its “market value 
[is] less than its book value. . . . Loans sink because . . . [among other reasons,] the 
loan collateral is worth less than the loan principal. . . .”  Barron’s Banking Dictionary: 
Underwater Loan Defi nition ,  ANSWERS.COM , http://answers.com/topic/underwater-
loan,  retrieved Apr. 15, 2012. 
 50.  MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM ’ N, MEETING OUR NATION ’ S HOUSING CHALLENGES 21 
(2002). 
 51.  JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION ’ S
HOUSING 2010 , at 17 (2010). 
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 Why did this escalation in home size and price and the subsequent col-
lapse of the housing market occur? Researchers generally agree that no 
single cause can be identified, and one team has identified at least thirteen 
factors: 
 corrupt mortgage lenders; fraudulent brokers; lax credit evaluations by 
underwriters; naïve borrowers; dishonest borrowers . . . ; under-regulated 
financial institutions; “teaser” and variable interest rates; compliant apprais-
ers; unrealistic rating agencies; conflicts of interest attaching to how credit 
rating agencies are paid; securitization of mortgage debt; “Wild West inves-
tor/risk takers”; . . . historically low interest rates. . . . [and] a contagious 
optimism accompanying real estate price increases.” 52
 Predatory lending practices were prevalent. 
 One former mortgage broker in Los Angeles said that . . . branches [of a mort-
gage lender] in upscale neighborhoods like Beverly Hills and Santa Monica 
had to slash their mortgage rates to be competitive with rival banks. But in 
areas that were predominantly minority, [the lender’s] rates were far higher 
because company executives knew borrowers in these neighborhoods had 
few, if any, alternatives. 53
 Another possible motivating force might be found in the traditional re-
lationship between home buyer/borrower and banker, a relationship that 
was founded more on moral grounds stemming from the promises that 
are exchanged by the parties to a residential mortgage transaction than on 
market-motivated grounds. 54 Suppose, for example, that a bank loan officer 
was approached by two persons, each seeking a loan of $400,000, one to 
purchase a home and the other to purchase equipment and pay bills of a 
startup business. Might the bank be more likely to grant a loan of that size 
to a person seeking a home than to a small business owner on the assump-
tion that the person seeking a home would be less likely to act strategi-
cally? 55 Is there a different notion of responsibility, a different assumption 
underlying the bargain with a prospective homeowner: the bank assumes 
the individual home purchaser would not walk away from the payment 
obligation? Built into the home mortgage is an implicit guarantee on the 
part of the residential mortgagor to act morally rather than market ratio-
nally: to refuse to engage in strategic action (economic breach) but to treat 
 52. Cohen & O’Byrne,  supra note 21, at 682–83 (footnotes omitted). 
 53.  MORGENSON & ROSNER ,  supra note 27, at 191. 
 54. I am indebted to my colleagues Eric Miller and Brendan Roediger for this 
suggestion. 
 55. Acting strategically in this context refers to the practice of strategic default: 
“walking away from an underwater home even though the owner could afford to 
pay the mortgage.” Nicholas Carroll,  Shifting the Focus from “ Strategic Default ”  to
“ Prudent Walkaway ,”  HUFFPOST BUS. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.huffi ngtonpost.
com/nicholas-carroll/shifting-the-focus-from-s_b_838843.html. 
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the mortgage as a promise (moral act) rather than as a business deal (mar-
ket act). 56
 That relationship changed with the advent of mortgage securitization 
and the computerization of loan transactions. 
 The face of banking had changed; regulators and lenders now spoke of ca-
veat emptor, let the borrower beware, when it came to lending practices. 
Why should bankers have to consider which mortgage product was really 
the best for the customer? It was better to let bankers innovate, creating a 
variety of products from which borrowers could choose. 57
 If the residential mortgagor does act strategically and breaches the promises 
contained in the note and mortgage for economically rational reasons, 58 the 
lender becomes angry. By walking away, the defaulting borrower threatens 
to transform the assumptions of responsibility underlying residential mort-
gage lending that differentiates it from commercial mortgage lending. 59 To 
discourage strategic defaults, the lender vigorously pursues foreclosure, 
even when the economically rational action may be acceptance of a short 
sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure because the net present value (NPV) of a 
short sale or deed-in-lieu is greater than that of a foreclosure. 60
 A variation of the theme of moral engagement as the foundation of resi-
dential mortgage transactions is the argument that homeownership decisions 
are highly emotional, but contract law “tends to ignore all emotion or punish 
it.” 61 Under this view, the housing bubble was fueled by emotion, driving 
 56. From a telephone survey of 1,000 adults, the legal information website, Find-
Law.com, reported that 60 percent of those surveyed believe that it is “never OK” to 
simply stop paying one’s mortgage note; 34 percent believe it is allowable to “walk 
away” from the mortgage “if they aren’t able to make the monthly payments”; and 
only 3 percent believe “strategic default” is acceptable at any time. Heather Hill 
Cernoch,  Survey: 60% of Americans Frown on Mortgage Abandonment ,  DSNEWS.COM
( Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/survey-60-of-americans-frown-
on-mortgage-abandonment-2011-04-06. 
 57.  MORGENSON & ROSNER ,  supra note 27, at 284. 
 58. Carroll,  supra note 55. 
 59. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that a bank will approach the two 
differently.  See, e.g. , Jay Goltz,  What Some Banks Don’t Want You to Know , N.Y.  TIMES , 
June 29, 2011, http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/what-some-banks-dont-
want-you-to-know/ (noting that an offi cer in a mid-sized Chicago-area bank in-
cludes a character assessment of small business owners as a factor in evaluating 
loan applications). 
 60. The National Mortgage Settlement requires mortgage servicers to “offer and 
facilitate loan modifi cations for borrowers rather than initiate foreclosure when 
such loan modifi cations . . . are net present value (NPV) positive and meet other . . . 
requirements.” Consent Judgment,  supra note 20, at A-16. 
 61. Cohen & O’Byrne,  supra note 21, at 697 (arguing that modern contract law 
disregards emotion because in the nineteenth century, when modern contract law 
developed, emotion “was associated directly with widespread hysteria, a disease 
typically attributed to women and understood as resulting from a failure to keep 
one’s emotions under control”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2056411
Homeownership—Dream or Disaster? 31
many people to purchase larger homes than they needed and to borrow more 
than they could afford to pay back. The resulting foreclosure crisis was caused, 
in significant part, by “the common law’s harsh response to emotion.” 62
 B. Residential Mortgage Crisis 
 In an earlier article, 63 I discussed briefly three changes in traditional resi-
dential mortgage practice that played crucial roles in the occurrence and 
severity of the residential mortgage crisis: (1) extensive use of adjustable 
rate mortgages and other alternative mortgage instruments, 64 (2) develop-
ment of mortgage securitization as an investment vehicle, 65 and (3) growth 
of the subprime mortgage market, largely made up of persons with low or 
nonexistent credit ratings, along with the phenomenon of predatory lend-
ing. 66 To this list should be added two more factors: reliance on third-party 
servicers to manage the collection and distribution of mortgage payments, 
and problems in the foreclosure process, caused in no small part by MERS, 
the mortgage electronic registration system. 
 1. Role of Mortgage Servicers 
 The mortgage servicing industry plays a crucial, but often misunder-
stood, role in residential mortgage finance. The detailed work of “ transaction 
 62.  Id . Cohen and O’Byrne argue that contract law’s allocation of risk equally to 
both parties did not work in the subprime residential mortgage market. 
 Everything untoward on the mortgage landscape, it seems, slipped by en-
tirely and egregiously undetected. As a result, and contrary to what the risk 
allocation model anticipated, only the mortgagor—and those who purchased 
structured fi nance products backed by that mortgage—actually bore the risk of 
borrower emotion. The lender exited long before. 
 Contract law’s focus on autonomy, contract enforcement, and abstraction and 
its concomitant tendency to see through the steely eyes of the imaged reasonable 
man also generated myopia in the regulators—yet another cause of the subprime 
crisis. 
Id . at 718–19. 
 63. Salsich,  supra note 7, at 11, 19–35. 
 64.  Id . at 25 (citing Stephen Cowen & Susan E. Foley,  New Trends in Residential 
Mortgage Finance , 13  REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1075 (1978); Stanley L. Iezman,  Al-
ternative Mortgage Instruments: Their Effect on Residential Financing , 10  REAL EST . L.J. 
3 (1981); Douglas W. Kmiec,  Shared Appreciation Mortgages: A Step Toward Making 
Housing a Bad Investment , 10  REAL EST. L.J. 302 (1982); Helen Jean Walleser,  Balancing 
the Interest: The Changing Complexion of Home Mortgage Financing in America , 31  DRAKE
L. REV. 1 (1981)). 
 65.  Id . at 27–30. Mortgage securitization also is discussed in Robin Malloy,  The 
Secondary Mortgage Market — A Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions , 39  SW. 
L.J . 991, 1003–10 (1986); and Michael Schill,  The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real 
Estate Law and Practice , 32 J.  MARSHALL L. REV . 269, 269–79 (1999). 
 66. Salsich,  supra note 7, at 30–32.  See generally Allen Fishbein & Harold Bunce, 
Subprime Market Growth and Predatory Lending: Housing Policy in the New Millennium, 
in  HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 273 (Susan M. Watcher & R. Leo Penne eds., 
2001),  available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/brd/13Fishbein.pdf. 
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processing,” mailing monthly bills, collecting monthly payments, remitting 
property taxes and insurance premiums, as well as “administration of de-
faulted loans,” 67 traditionally was done by the lender that made the loan 
and kept that loan in its portfolio. But as more loans were sold through the 
secondary market and mortgage financing shifted from a localized busi-
ness to a national and even international business, a separate industry of 
mortgage servicing arose. Mortgage brokers and other financial institutions 
increasingly took on the servicing responsibilities in return for generous 
fees and little risk. 68
 Mortgage servicers interact with both home buyer/borrowers and in-
vestors in mortgage-backed securities in ways that resemble the principal-
agency relationship but are not formally recognized as such. While 
 borrowers and investors may think of servicers as their agents, servicers 
function more like independent contractors. Adam Levitin and Tara 
Twomey note that “[t]he business model and economics of servicing re-
main largely unexplored.” 
 The economics of the servicing industry often discourage the restructuring 
of defaulted mortgage loans, even when it would be value-maximizing for 
mortgage investors. . . . Servicers have little incentive to invest in the re-
sources for hands-on loss mitigation, much less sufficient capacity for peak 
volumes. The combination of business lines means servicers are ill-prepared 
to perform their loss mitigation function in a way that maximizes value for 
mortgage investors. Although housing markets are cyclical, servicers find 
it more profitable to automate everything across the cycle than to invest in 
countercyclical hands-on loss mitigation when the market is up in prepara-
tion for when the market falls. 69
 Servicers are compensated on a fee-for-service basis over the life of the 
loan, an arrangement that creates a different set of incentives from those 
of investors that are compensated based on the value of their investment. 
Levitin and Twomey argue that the servicer compensation format results in 
“a moral hazard because the servicer does not bear the same costs of its loss 
mitigation decisions as do investors.” 70 Their interests diverge, with the re-
sult that foreclosure decisions may be made with little or no consideration 
of investors’ interests, not to mention those of the defaulting borrowers and 
the communities in which they live. 
 2. Problems with the Foreclosure Process 
 Foreclosure is governed by state law, which establishes a procedure to 
enable lenders to recover property from defaulting borrowers through a 
public sale process. Two different methods are utilized: judicial foreclo-
 67. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey,  Mortgage Servicing ,  28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 
(2011). 
 68.  Id . at 11. 
 69.  Id . at 4–5. 
 70.  Id . at 5. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2056411
Homeownership—Dream or Disaster? 33
sure, 71 in which the foreclosure process requires a judicial hearing to autho-
rize a public sale of the mortgaged property, and power of sale foreclosure, 72
in which a mortgagor or a trustee can offer mortgaged property to the high-
est bidder at a public sale after giving twenty days public notice. 73 Judi-
cial foreclosure is administered by state courts in twenty-three states. The 
power of sale foreclosure process is administered by loan servicers through 
trustees in the other twenty-seven states. 74
 a. Impact of MERS 
 MERS was created as an electronic registration system by a group of 
lenders, servicers, and government agencies, including Fannie Mae, Fred-
die Mac, the FHA, and the Veterans Administration, in the aftermath of 
the 1993 savings and loan crisis. In what amounts to a short course, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota described MERS as follows: 
 MERS does not originate, lend, service, or invest in home mortgage loans. 
Instead, MERS acts as the nominal mortgagee for the loans owned by its 
members. The MERS system is designed to allow its members, which in-
clude originators, lenders, servicers, and investors, to assign home mort-
gage loans without having to record each transfer in the local land recording 
offices where the real estate securing the mortgage is located. MERS mem-
bers pay subscriber fees to register on the MERS system, as well as other fees 
on each loan registered and each transaction conducted. 
 . . . .  
 Traditionally, each mortgage loan transfer on the primary and second-
ary market included an assignment of the security instrument that could 
be recorded in the local land recording office where the real estate securing 
the mortgage loan is located. According to MERS, multiple assignments of 
the security instrument commonly caused confusion, delays, and chain-of-
title problems. In an effort to streamline the assignment process, MERS es-
sentially privatized part of the mortgage recording system. Participants in 
the mortgage industry can subscribe as members on the MERS system. A 
loan held by a member is registered in the MERS database. Once registered, 
MERS serves as the mortgagee of record for all loans in its system. More 
specifically, MERS is the nominal mortgagee for the lender and any succes-
sors and assigns. When the security instrument is recorded, the local land 
records list MERS as the mortgagee. 
 71.  See, e.g. , 735  ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1501  et seq . 
 72.  See, e.g. ,  MO. REV. STAT. §§ 443.290–.410. 
 73. RealtyTrac®, the California-based organization that keeps track of real es-
tate transactions, including foreclosures, organizes its reports of documents fi led in 
foreclosure actions into three categories: Default—Notice of Default (NOD) and Lis 
Pendens (LIS); Auction—Notice of Trustee Sale (NTS) and Notice of Foreclosure Sale 
(NFS); and Real Estate Owned, or REO properties (that have been foreclosed upon and 
repurchased by a bank).  See Foreclosure Overview and Foreclosure Process ,  REALTYTRAC ®, 
http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure/overview.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
 74. For a discussion of the two methods of foreclosure, see  GRANT S. NELSON & 
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.11–.30 (5th ed. 2007). 
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 The benefit of naming MERS as the nominal mortgagee of record is that 
when the member transfers an interest in a mortgage loan to another MERS 
member, MERS privately tracks the assignment within its system but re-
mains the mortgagee of record. According to MERS, this system “saves lend-
ers time and money, and reduces paperwork, by eliminating the need to 
prepare and record assignments when trading loans.” 
 There is limited information in the record on the language used for trans-
fers of loans within the MERS system. Publicly available documents, namely 
pooling and servicing agreements filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, suggest that when loans are transferred between MERS mem-
bers, an assignment of the promissory note is executed but an assignment of 
the security instrument is not—although the original security instrument is 
physically delivered along with the promissory note. 
 A side effect of the MERS system is that a transfer of an interest in a 
mortgage loan between two MERS members is unknown to those outside 
the MERS system. If, on the other hand, a MERS member transfers an inter-
est in a mortgage loan to a non-MERS member, MERS no longer acts as the 
mortgagee of record and an assignment of the security instrument to the 
non-MERS member is drafted, executed, and typically recorded in the local 
land recording office. 
 When documentation is necessary, such as for an assignment to a non-
MERS member, MERS does not draft or execute the paperwork on behalf of 
its members. Rather, MERS instructs its members to have someone on their 
own staff become a certified MERS officer with authority to sign on behalf 
of MERS. This procedure allows the member that owns the indebtedness to 
assign or foreclose the mortgage loan in the name of MERS, eliminating the 
need to either work through a third party or to execute an assignment of the 
security instrument from MERS back to the member. 75
 Professor Gerald Korngold has described benefits associated with MERS 
as follows: 
 MERS facilitates an efficient secondary market in mortgages by allowing 
the easy transfer of beneficial rights. After the initial recording in the local 
clerk’s office, subsequent transactions can be done quickly at a low cost from 
a central location utilizing modern technology without the need for local re-
cording of paper assignment documents. Such a process facilitates the flow 
of global capital, bringing investment funds into areas without local mort-
gage financing. Potential homeowners, as well as those seeking the most 
favorable rates, can benefit from MERS. 76
 By May 2007, MERS had become the recorder of choice with sixty million 
loans recorded in its name, which amounted to “[s]ixty percent of all new 
mortgage originations . . . and more than half of the nation’s existing resi-
dential loans.” 77
 75. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 490–91 (Minn. 
2009) (footnote omitted). 
 76. Gerald Korngold,  Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and 
Mortgage Financing Crisis , 60 S.C. L.  REV . 727, 742 (2009). 
 77. Peterson,  supra note 19, at 1373. 
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 As the foreclosure crisis was beginning to unfold in 2006, former Chief 
Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals, in a call for legislative 
review of the “incongruity between the needs of the modern electronic sec-
ondary mortgage market and our venerable real property laws regulating 
the market,” captured both the benefits and concerns triggered by MERS. 78
 The benefits of the system to MERS members are not insubstantial. Through 
use of MERS as nominee, lenders are relieved of the costs of recording each 
mortgage assignment with the County Clerk, instead paying minimal yearly 
membership fees to MERS. Transfers of mortgage instruments are faster, al-
lowing for efficient trading in the secondary mortgage market; a mortgage 
changes hands at least five times on average. 
 Although creating efficiencies for its members, there is little evidence that 
the MERS system provides equivalent benefits to home buyers and borrower—
and, in fact, some evidence that it may create substantial disadvantages. While 
MERS necessarily opted for a system that tracks both the beneficial owner 
of the loan and the servicer of the loan, its 800 number and website allow a 
borrower to access information regarding only his or her loan servicer, not 
the underlying lender. The lack of disclosure may create substantial difficulty 
when a homeowner wishes to negotiate the terms of his or her mortgage or 
enforce a legal right against the mortgagee and is unable to learn the mort-
gagee’s identity. Public records will no longer contain this information as, if 
it achieves the success it envisions, the MERS system will render the public 
record useless by masking beneficial ownership of mortgages and eliminating 
records of assignments altogether. Not only will this information deficit de-
tract from the amount of public data accessible for research and monitoring of 
industry trends, but it may also function, perhaps unintentionally, to insulate a 
noteholder from liability, mask lender error and hide predatory lending prac-
tices. The county clerks, of course, are concerned about the depletion of their 
 revenues—allegedly over one million dollars a year in Suffolk County alone. 79
 Judge Kaye admitted that “we do not know . . . the extent to which these 
concerns will be realized” but deemed it “prudent” to call to the attention 
of the legislature “a disparity between the relevant statute . . . and the bur-
geoning modern-day electronic mortgage industry.” 80
 Confusion resulting from MERS’s role in the foreclosure process has 
raised a host of questions. Michael Powell and Gretchen Morgenson, writ-
ing in the  New York Times , summarize the MERS questions as follows: 
 How can MERS claim title to those mortgages, and foreclose on homeown-
ers, when it has not invested a dollar in a single loan? And, more funda-
mentally: Given the evidence that many banks have cut corners and made 
foreclosure mistakes, does anyone know who owns what or owes what to 
whom anymore? 81
 78. MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 86, 88–89 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., 
dissenting in part). 
 79.  Id . at 88–89. 
 80.  Id . at 89. 
 81. Michael Powell & Gretchen Morgenson,  MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your 
Loan , N.Y.  TIMES (Mar. 6, 2011), at BU1. 
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 More technical, legal questions include: Should servicers have to prove 
they have standing to bring foreclosure actions by presenting the original 
note? 82 Does the robo-signing scandal indicate a lack of due process for 
homeowners or an abuse of the judicial process? 83 On whom should the 
burden of proof be—the homeowner to establish that the lender is not en-
titled to foreclose, or the lender to establish that it is entitled to foreclose? 84
 b. Judicial Responses to Foreclosure Challenges 
 Courts have been brought into the fray and generally have responded 
by strictly construing state mortgage law. For example, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts, in  U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez
(and a companion case,  Wells Fargo Bank v. LaRace ), 85 held that U.S. Bank 
and Wells Fargo Bank, acting as trustees for assignees who held mortgages, 
failed to establish that they held the applicable mortgages when they fore-
closed and thus “failed to demonstrate that they acquired fee simple title to 
these properties by purchasing them at the foreclosure sale.” 86
 Examining the Massachusetts statutory power of sale requirements and 
“[r]ecognizing the substantial power that the statutory scheme affords to a 
mortgage holder,” the court reiterated “the familiar rule that ‘one who sells 
under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms.’ ” Failure to do so 
renders a sale “wholly void.” 87 The court stressed that authority to exercise 
the statutory power of sale is limited to holders of the mortgages or assign-
ees of those mortgages “at the time of the notice of sale and the subsequent 
foreclosure sale.” 88
 U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo Bank, as trustees of mortgage-backed securi-
ties made up of pools of mortgages, were at the end of a long trail of assign-
ments. 89 For example, the record owner of the Ibanez mortgage was Option 
 82. Gretchen Morgenson,  Don’t Just Tell Us. Show Us , N.Y.  TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010), 
at BU1 (reporting that the U.S. Trustee Program in the Justice Department has 
sought to challenge banks’ efforts to foreclose through removal of automatic stays 
in bankruptcy proceedings by arguing that the banks did not have standing to seek 
automatic stays because they had not proved that they were the holders, or agents 
of the holders, of the notes involved in the foreclosures). 
 83.  Id . 
 84. When the question is framed in this manner, one is reminded of the suc-
cessful movement in the 1970s to shift the effective burden of proof from tenant to 
landlord on the question of responsibility for the condition of the demised premises. 
See, e.g. , Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 85. 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). 
 86.  Id . at 55. 
 87.  Id . at 50 (alteration in original). 
 88.  Id . at 51. 
 89. For example, the chain of title provided by the court for the Ibanez mortgage 
is: “Rose Mortgage, Inc. (originator), Option One Mortgage Corporation (record 
holder), Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (seller), Struc-
tured Asset Securities Corporation (depositor), U.S. Bank National Association, as 
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One Mortgage Corp., the first assignee in the U.S. Bank chain of title. U.S. 
Bank claimed its assignment occurred pursuant to a trust agreement dated 
December 1, 2006, the effective date of the mortgage. That trust agreement 
was not recorded, and a 273-page private placement memorandum contain-
ing an “unsigned offer of mortgage-backed securities to potential investors,” 
which was recorded, did not list the Ibanez mortgage as part of the mortgage 
pool governed by the trust agreement. 90 The court concluded that because 
Option One was the mortgage holder of record at the time of the foreclosure, 
U.S. Bank did not have the authority to foreclose the mortgage, nor did it 
have the authority to purchase the property at the foreclosure sale. 91
 In New York, while the Court of Appeals held in 2006 that county clerks 
were statutorily required to record and index mortgages, assignments of 
mortgages, and discharges that named MERS as the lender’s nominee or 
mortgagee of record, 92 it left open the question whether MERS or its as-
signee has standing to bring foreclosure actions. 93 Five years later, a New 
York appellate court in  Bank of New York v. Silverberg held that an assignee 
from MERS lacked standing to begin foreclosure proceedings. 94 Noting 
that MERS “was listed in the underlying mortgage instruments as a nomi-
nee and mortgagee for the purpose of recording, but was never the actual 
holder or assignee of the underlying notes,” 95 the court concluded that the 
purported assignment by MERS was “a nullity” because MERS never ac-
quired title to or possession of the underlying notes. 96 In so holding, the 
court cited a long line of cases emphasizing that a mortgage “is merely se-
curity for a debt . . . and cannot exist independently of the debt.” 97
 The court acknowledged that its decision may have a serious impact on 
the mortgage industry, but asserted that “the law must not yield to expedi-
ency and the convenience of lending institutions. Proper procedures must 
be followed to ensure the reliability of the claim of ownership, to secure the 
dependable transfer of property, and to assure the enforcement of the rules 
that govern real property.” 98
trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Cer-
tifi cates, Series 2006-Z.” Rose Mortgage, Inc., the original lender, began the chain 
by executing an assignment in blank, which was later stamped with Option One 
Mortgage Corporation’s name and recorded on June 7, 2006, approximately six 
months after the loan was made. The mortgage pool that was converted into the 
Series 2006-Z Pass-Through Certifi cates contained over 1,200 mortgages.  Id . at 46. 
 90.  Id . at 46–47. 
 91.  Id . at 52. 
 92. MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 86, 88–89 (N.Y. 2006). 
 93.  Id . at 100 (Ciparick, J., concurring). 
 94. 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 2011). 
 95.  Id . at 533. 
 96.  Id . at 539. 
 97.  Id . at 537 (quoting FGB Realty Advisors v. Parisi, 696 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div. 
1999)). 
 98.  Id . at 539. 
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 The court distinguished an earlier case holding that MERS had foreclo-
sure power 99 by noting that in the earlier case, “the lender had transferred 
and tendered the promissory note to MERS before the commencement of 
the foreclosure action.” 100
 A federal judge in Oregon invalidated a nonjudicial foreclosure as 
“wrongful” because Bank of America and MERS, both defendants in the 
case, “failed to record all assignments of the trust deed” in violation of the 
Oregon Trust Deed Act. 101 The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had 
not made any payments on the note for eighteen months, but concluded 
 that failure does not permit defendants to violate Oregon law regulating 
non-judicial foreclosure. The Oregon Trust Deed Act “represents a well-
coordinated statutory scheme to protect grantors from the unauthorized 
foreclosure and wrongful sale of property, while at the same time providing 
creditors with a quick and efficient remedy against a defaulting grantor.” In 
part due to the legislature’s desire “to protect the grantor against the unau-
thorized loss of its property,” a party conducting a non-judicial foreclosure 
must demonstrate strict compliance with the Act. 102
 Noting that document review by Bank of America and MERS officials 
“appear[ed] rushed,” and that several instances of unrecorded transfers of 
the trust deed’s beneficial interest appeared in the MERS internal record-
keeping system, the court questioned the “appropriateness and validity of 
foreclosure by advertisement and sale outside of any judicial proceeding” 
in cases involving MERS because “the MERS system creates confusion as to 
who has the authority to do what with the trust deed.” 103
 Not all the court decisions have gone against MERS. In Minnesota, 
MERS survived a class action challenge to its use of the state’s foreclosure 
by advertisement (nonjudicial foreclosure) statute. 104 An amendment to the 
Minnesota Recording Act, dubbed the “MERS statute” because it was en-
acted in 2004 in response to “questions raised about the MERS system,” 
authorized nominees to record assignments and powers of attorney to fore-
close. 105 Plaintiffs challenged MERS’s power to foreclose by advertisement, 
alleging that MERS had not complied with that statute 106 because it had “not 
recorded and given notice of the promissory note assignments between its 
 99. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 838 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 
2007). 
 100.  Silverberg , 926 N.Y.S.2d at 674. 
 101. Hooker v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 10-3111-PA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
57005 (D. Or. May 25, 2011) (applying  OR. REV. STAT . § 86.735(1)). 
 102.  Id . at *9 (citation omitted). 
 103.  Id . at *17. 
 104. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 490–91 
(Minn. 2009). 
 105.  Id . (quoting Act of Apr. 6, 2004, ch. 153, § 2, 2004 Minn. Laws 76, 76–77 (codi-
fi ed at  MINN. STAT  § 507.413 (2008))). 
 106.  MINN. STAT . §§ 580.02, .04. 
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members.” 107 Applying the language of the statute, in particular the clause 
“debt then remaining  secured by such mortgage ,” the court concluded that 
the statutory recording requirement applied only to the mortgage, which 
was held by MERS as nominee for the lender and its assigns, and not to the 
underlying promissory note, which was transferred freely among MERS 
members. 108
 The Supreme Court of Michigan, reversing a decision of the court of ap-
peals that MERS, as mortgagee, could not institute foreclosure by advertise-
ment under Michigan’s nonjudicial foreclosure statute, 109 held that MERS 
was entitled to foreclose because it held “an interest in the indebtedness.” 110
 The rule is well-settled that . . . the mortgagee has a lien on the land to se-
cure the debt. It has never been necessary that the mortgage should be given 
directly to the beneficiaries. The security is always made in trust to secure 
obligations, and the trust and the beneficial interest need not be in the same 
hands. . . . The choice of a mortgagee is a matter of convenience. . . . [I]n cases 
in which the mortgagee had transferred a beneficial interest, but retained 
record title, this Court has unanimously held that “[o]nly the record holder 
of the mortgage has the power to foreclose; the validity of the foreclosure is 
not affected by any unrecorded assignment of interest held for security.” 111
 The court construed the statutory term “interest in the indebtedness” as 
evidencing an “intent to include mortgagees of record among the parties 
entitled to foreclose by advertisement.” 112
 In California, courts have refused to entertain lawsuits questioning the 
authority of MERS to institute nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, 113 or 
that MERS is not a proper beneficiary of a deed of trust. 114 Calling it a “legal 
loophole,” the California Court of Appeal refused to entertain the argu-
ment that MERS did not have the authority to initiate foreclosure proceed-
ings because it was not the holder of the note. 
 [T]he deed of trust in this case specifically states: “Borrower understands 
and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Bor-
rower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or 
custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) 
 107.  Jackson , 770 N.W.2d at 495. 
 108.  Id . at 496. 
 109.  MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.3201  et seq . 
 110. Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183, 183 (Mich. 2011). 
 111.  Id . at 183–84 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ar-
nold v. DMR Fin., 532 N.W.2d 852 (Mich. 1995)). 
 112.  Id . at 184 (construing  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3204(1)(d)). 
 113. Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 824 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (noting that “nowhere does the [California nonjudicial foreclosure] stat-
ute provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the fore-
closure process is indeed authorized, and we see no ground for implying such an 
action”). 
 114. Ferguson v. Avelo Mortg., LLC, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Ct. App. 2011). 
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has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not lim-
ited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action 
required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this 
Security Instrument.” 115
 In concluding that California does not require a person bringing a nonjudi-
cial foreclosure proceeding to possess the underlying note, the court cited 
three federal district court opinions to that effect. 116
 III. Governmental Support for Voluntary 
Programmatic Responses 
 States, Congress, and the Bush and Obama administrations have strug-
gled to develop appropriate responses to the huge volume of foreclosures. 
But achieving success with a program that would “rescue the needy but not 
the reckless or greedy” has proved to be very difficult. 117
 A. HOPE NOW Alliance 
 The first organized federal government response was the HOPE NOW 
Alliance, a Bush administration initiative launched in October 2007. 118 In 
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community 
Opportunity, Executive Director Faith Schwartz described the Alliance as 
a “broad-based voluntary collaboration between lenders, HUD-approved 
housing counselors, investors, mortgage market participants and trade 
associations . . . [including] 34 servicer members which account for over 
ninety percent of the subprime market and nearly seventy percent of the 
prime market.” 119
 115.  Id . at 593. 
 116.  Id . at 594 (citing Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 
1189 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Odinma v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. C-09-4674 EDL, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 28347, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010); Morgera v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01476-MCE-GGH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2037, at *21 (E.D. 
Cal. Jan. 11, 2010)). 
 117. Salsich,  supra note 7, at 11 n.2, citing David M. Herszenhorn & Vikas Bajaj, 
The Tricky Task of Offering Aid to Homeowners , N.Y.  TIMES , Apr. 6, 2008, at A1, A17. One 
study concluded that “[a]s much as 70 percent of recent early payment defaults had 
fraudulent misrepresentations on their original loan applications.” Tyler Cowen,  So 
We Thought, But Then Again . . . , N.Y.  TIMES , Jan. 13, 2008, at BU6 (discussing a study 
of more than three million loans between 1997 and 2006).  See also  OCCUPANCY FRAUD
AND THE IMPACT ON THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY (2008) by BasePoint Analytics, a lender 
consulting fi rm. The opening of Senate debate on a Banking Committee compro-
mise bill, discussed  infra , was met with the threat of a presidential veto. Lori Mont-
gomery,  Veto Threatened for Housing Bill: White House Objects to Funding Plan for FHA 
Program ,  WASH. POST, June 20, 2008, at D2. 
 118. Press Release, HOPE NOW Alliance Created to Help Distressed Homeown-
ers (Oct. 10, 2007), www.HOPENOW.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). 
 119.  Examining the Making Home Affordable Plan, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.on 
Housing and Community Opportunity of the Comm. on Fin. Services , Mar. 19, 2009. at 1 
(statement of Statement of Faith Schwartz, Executive Director, HOPE NOW Alliance). 
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 According to Schwartz, the Alliance offers counseling services to “bor-
rowers who may have or expect to have difficulty making their mortgage 
payments” and, where appropriate, helps negotiate loan modifications 
and other workout solutions. 120 The Alliance maintains a national hotline 
(889.995.HOPE) and a website (www.hopenow.com) to enable borrowers 
to connect with counselors and mortgage servicers. Other services include 
organizing local programs where borrowers can talk in person with non-
profit counselors; serving as a clearinghouse for servicers developing “best 
practices in servicing”; coordinating information-sharing among govern-
ment agencies, the GSEs, and servicers “as they develop policies to apply 
to loan modification efforts”; serving as “a contact and facilitator” for coun-
seling agencies and servicers; and collecting and publishing “data on ac-
tual loan workouts and modifications.” 121
 The HOPE NOW Alliance provides crucial counseling, mediation, and 
data collection services that are integral to any effective foreclosure re-
sponse program. But the success of such efforts depends heavily on the 
willingness of servicers to participate, something that many servicers 
initially were reluctant to do. While advocates and counselors have been 
able to achieve loan modifications in individual situations, the size of the 
problem threatens to dwarf those successes. In January 2010, for example, 
success in achieving 150,000 loan modifications that month 122 was quali-
fied by the fact that almost 4 million mortgages were at least sixty days 
delinquent. 123 An attorney for borrowers dealing with mortgage delinquen-
cies and foreclosures captured the enormity of the problem: “I’ve gotten 
resolutions for clients in individual cases, but I’m just a flea on the tail of 
an elephant.” 124
 HOPE NOW reports slow but steady progress in the five years since its 
inception. For example, over one million homeowners received loan modi-
fications in 2011, which exceeded the approximately 843,000 foreclosure 
sales completed that year. 125 Albeit impressive, those figures still paled in 
comparison with the 2.8 million mortgages that were reported to be at least 
sixty days delinquent in December 2011. 126
 120.  Id . 
 121.  Id . 
 122. Press Release, HOPE NOW Alliance (Mar. 17, 2010),  available from http://
www.hopenow.com/press/fi les/Data%20release_03_17_10.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 
2010). 
 123. Press Release, HOPE NOW Alliance (May 10. 2010),  available from http://
www.hopenow.com/press/fi les/1QDataRelease_05_10_10.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 
2012). 
 124. Morgenson,  supra note 82, quoting Howard D. Rothbloom, an Atlanta at-
torney who represents homeowners in bankruptcy proceedings. 
 125. Press Release, HOPE NOW Alliance (Feb. 7, 2012),  available from http://
www.hopenow.com/Press/fi les/HN2011Fulldata_FIN . . . (last visited Mar. 27, 
2012). 
 126.  Id . 
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 The $25 billion that Bank of America and the four other banks commit-
ted to pay in settlement of foreclosure misconduct claims 127 is a significant 
amount, but it will not resolve all cases. 128 Of perhaps greater long term im-
portance is the banks’ agreement to implement “comprehensive reform of 
mortgage servicing practices.” 129 Among practices to be implemented are 
requirements that “affidavits, sworn statements and Declarations . . . [be] 
based on . . . review and personal knowledge [as well as] competent and 
reliable evidence”; 130 procedures be implemented “to ensure accuracy and 
timely updating” of accounts; 131 regular reviews be conducted of “a sta-
tistically valid sample” of affidavits, sworn statements, notices of default, 
etc., to ensure accuracy and compliance with prevailing law and the settle-
ment agreement; 132 servicers notify “potentially eligible borrowers” of loss 
mitigation options and “offer and facilitate” loan modifications rather than 
foreclosure when loan modifications “are net present value (NPV) posi-
tive.” 133 Moreover, borrowers who have submitted complete loan modifica-
tion applications cannot be referred to foreclosure while those applications 
are pending; 134 an “easily accessible and reliable single point of contact 
(SPOC)” shall be established for each borrower potentially eligible for loan 
modification consideration and will be identified “promptly” to borrowers 
who request loss mitigation assistance; 135 servicers must reach out to “all 
potentially eligible delinquent borrowers (other than those in bankruptcy)” 
to inform them of loss mitigation options,” 136 including establishing “an 
online portal . . . where borrowers can check, at no cost, the status of their 
 127. Nat’l Mortgage Settlement,  Fact Sheet, supra note 20. 
 128. For example, one analysis of the principal reduction portion of the agree-
ment, the largest portion of the settlement in dollar amounts, estimates that only 5 
percent of underwater mortgagors will obtain relief, in part because of strict eligi-
bility conditions. Suzy Khimm,  Only 5% of Underwater Loans Might Get Settlement’s 
Principal Reductions, Report Says ,  WASH. POST , Mar. 2, 2012, http://www.washing
tonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/only-5percent-. . . (citing Brookings Institution 
study). 
 129.  NAT ’ L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF MULTSTATE/FEDERAL
SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS,  retrieved from http://www.national
mortgagesettlement.com/states (Mar. 24, 2012). 
 130. United States v. Bank of America Corp., Case 1:12-cv-00361-RMC, at Exh. A, 
Settlement Term Sheet, 4. Loss Mitigation, I.A.3. (Mar. 12, 2012) (consent judgment), 
retrieved from http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about-the-settlement 
(Mar. 24, 2012). 
 131.  Id . at I.B.1. 
 132.  Id . at I.E.1. 
 133.  Id . at IV.A.1; IV.A.2. 
 134.  Id . at IV.B.1. 
 135.  Id . at IV.C.1; IV.C.2. 
 136.  Id . at IV.D.1. 
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first lien loan modifications.” 137 Loss mitigation staffing and systems must 
be adequate in number, training, and experience and must not be com-
pensated in a manner that “encourage[s] foreclosure over loss mitigation 
alternatives.” 138
 B. HOPE for Homeowners (H4H) 
 A new FHA program launched in 2008 to insure mortgages issued to 
refinance existing single-family mortgages of owner-occupiers in danger 
of losing their homes to foreclosure became the centerpiece of early leg-
islative foreclosure relief efforts. Enacted as a temporary program by the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) in July 2008, 139 the 
HOPE for Homeowners (H4H) program was open to borrowers who had 
entered into their loans on or before December 31, 2007, and had a mort-
gage debt-to-income ratio greater than 35 percent as of March 1, 2008. 140 The 
program took effect October 1, 2008, and ended on September 30, 2011. 141
Eligible borrowers had to certify that they owned no other residence and 
had not intentionally defaulted on the existing mortgage or falsified in-
formation to obtain the mortgage. 142 Refinancing loans were restricted to 
thirty-year, fixed-rate notes and mortgages 143 and originally were limited 
to 90 percent of the “current appraised value” of the property. 144 However, 
the 90 percent limitation later was modified as noted below. 145 Counsel-
ing for homeowners and renters was emphasized and grants to states and 
local governments authorized. 146 In addition, state housing finance agen-
cies received a temporary increase in housing bond issue authority to en-
able them to refinance “qualified subprime” loans, defined as “adjustable 
rate single-family residential mortgage loan[s] made after December 31, 
2001, and before January 1, 2008, that the bond issuer determines would 
be reasonably likely to cause financial hardship to the borrower if not 
refinanced.” 147
 137.  Id . at IV.E.1. 
 138.  Id . at IV.H.1; IV.H.3; IV.H.5. 
 139. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-
289, 122 Stat. 2654 (effective July 30, 2008, codifi ed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 4501–4520). 
 140.  Id . §§ 1401–1404 (HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008, adding new § 257 to 
Title II of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23). 
 141. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23(r). 
 142. HERA § 1402(a). 
 143.  Id . 
 144.  Id . 
 145.  Infra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 146. HERA §§ 2401–02. 
 147.  Id . § 3021 (amending § 143(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by add-
ing new paragraph (12)). 
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 All types of existing single-family, one-to-four unit, primary residence 
loans were eligible for refinancing with H4H FHA-insured loans,  including 
ones with interest only or negative amortization features. 148 The nationwide 
maximum mortgage amount for an H4H loan ranged from $550,440 (one 
unit) to $1,058,574 (four units). FHA guidelines, including the requirement 
for an appraisal by an FHA-approved appraiser, had to be followed. Inter-
est rates were negotiable as long as they were “commensurate with those 
offered for similar loan types.” 149
 Lender participation was voluntary and few lenders expressed interest 
when the program was implemented. A major cause for lender concern 
was the requirement that lenders agree to reduce outstanding principal 
balances on all existing loans so that the H4H refinancing loan would 
be within allowable loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. Permissible LTV ratios 
later were increased from 90 percent to 105 percent for borrowers cur-
rent on existing mortgages; 96.5 percent for delinquent borrowers with 
payment-to-income (PTI) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios of 30 percent 
or lower and 42 percent or lower, respectively; and 90 percent for delin-
quent borrowers with PTI and DTI ratios as high as 38 and 50 percent, 
respectively, and for current borrowers with credit scores below 500. 150
Lenders were required to agree to “accept any loss from writing down 
the principal to the required LTV ratio.” They were also required to extin-
guish all outstanding loans and forgive all advances for tax and insurance 
as well as expenses associated with foreclosure filings and preservation 
of property. 151
 The voluntary nature of the program on the part of both borrowers and 
lenders, the perception that the requirements for refinancing were overly 
restrictive, and the severity of the recession produced relatively few par-
ticipants. The Obama administration threw its weight behind its Home 
Affordable Modification Program, discussed  infra , and allowed the H4H 
program to expire on its sunset date of September 30, 2011. 152
 148. HUD Mortgagee Letter 2009-43 (Oct. 20, 2009),  retrieved from www.hud.
gov/offi ces/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/index.cfm (Oct. 26, 2010) (explain-
ing amendments to the H4H program in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 
amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23(e)(1)(B) and the Helping Families Save Their Homes 
Act of 2009, adding 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23(x); Comptroller of the Currency, Commu-
nity Developments Fact Sheet, FHA HOPE for Homeowners Program , retrieved from
http://www.occ.gov/static/community-affairs/fact-sheets/FHA_HOPE_for_Ho-
meowners_Program.FS.pdf (Oct. 26, 2010). 
 149.  Id . 
 150.  Id . 
 151. HOPE for Homeowners Act,  supra note 139, § 257(e)(4); Community De-
velopments Fact Sheet, FHA HOPE for Homeowners Program,  supra note 148, at 4. 
 152. HUD Mortgagee Letter 11-20, Termination of the HOPE for Homeown-
ers (H4H) Program ( June 10, 2011),  retrieved from portal.hud.gov/hudportal/ 
document/huddoc?id=11-20ml.pdf (Mar. 28, 2012). 
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 C. Housing Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) 
 On February 18, 2009, the Obama administration announced its Hom-
eowner Affordability and Stability Plan, 153 the third attempt by the federal 
government to come to grips with the foreclosure crisis. Now known as the 
Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, it became “an umbrella program 
for the administration’s homeowner assistance and foreclosure prevention 
efforts,” with an allocation of $45.6 billion from the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP). 154 The Treasury Department-sponsored Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) is the administration’s flagship housing sup-
port program. 155 HAMP is a voluntary program “designed to help financially 
struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by modifying loans to a level that 
is affordable for borrowers now and sustainable over the long term.” 156
 HAMP’s major initiative provides incentives to servicers and investors 
to encourage modifications of first lien mortgages for eligible  homeowners 
“currently in default or at imminent risk of default.” 157 The Treasury 
 153. SIGTARP:  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 55 ( Jan. 26, 2012), citing President Barack 
Obama, Remarks by the President on the Home Mortgage Crisis (Feb. 18, 2009), 
retrieved from http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports.shtml (Mar. 30, 2012) [hereinafter 
SIGTARP  REPORT ( Jan. 2012)]. 
 154.  Id . 
 155.  Id . at 60. Unless extended, HAMP is scheduled to terminate December 31, 
2013. MHA, Supplemental Directive 12-02, Making Home Affordable Program–
MHA Extension and Expansion 2 (Mar. 9, 2012) (announcing extension of MHA 
“and all of its component programs through December 31, 2013”),  retrieved from
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/hamp.jsp (Mar. 31, 2012). 
 156. Home Affordable Modifi cation Program: Overview,  retrieved from https://
www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/hamp.jsp (Mar. 31, 2012). 
 157. SIGTARP  REPORT ( Jan. 2012),  supra note 153. In addition to its fi rst-lien mort-
gage program, HAMP includes three smaller subprograms: (1) Home Price Decline 
Protection (HPDP), TARP-funded investor incentives to offset home price declines; 
(2) Principal Reduction Alternatives (PRA), TARP-funded investor incentives to en-
courage the use of principal reduction in loan modifi cations, and (3) Home Afford-
able Unemployment Program (UP), which assists unemployed homeowners through 
temporary forbearance of all or a portion of their mortgage payments.  Id . at 55–56. 
 Other related programs include (1) Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives 
(HAFA), discussed  infra , which provides incentives to servicers and borrowers to 
pursue short sales and deed-in-lieu of foreclosures where HAMP modifi cations are 
not successful; (2) Second Lien Modifi cation Program (2MP), which provides incen-
tives to servicers to enable second liens to be modifi ed along with corresponding 
fi rst liens; (3) HAMP-like loan modifi cation programs within the FHA, Veterans Ad-
ministration, and the Department of Agriculture; (4) FHA Short Refi nance program 
to encourage refi nancing of non-FHA-insured underwater mortgage loans into 
FHA-insured loans with lower principle balances; (5) Treasury/FHA Second Lien 
program (FHA2LP) providing incentives to servicers and investors to reduce or ex-
tinguish second liens on FHA-refi nanced loans; and (6) Housing Finance Agency 
Hardest Hit Fund (HHF), a TARP-funded foreclosure prevention program operated 
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 Department originally paid participating servicers $1,000 for each perma-
nent modification completed under HAMP, and an additional $500 if the 
borrower was current but at imminent risk of default before enrolling in 
HAMP’s first phase, i.e., a trial modification. 158 In October 2011, the incen-
tive payment was changed to a sliding scale ranging from $1,600 for loans 
no more than 120 days delinquent, $1,200 for loans between 120 days and 
210 days delinquent, and $400 for loans more than 210 days delinquent. 
The $500 current borrower fee also was dropped. 159 Servicers also can earn 
$1,000 per year for three years, or one-half of the reduction in the borrower’s 
monthly payment (the so-called pay-for-success fee) for any borrowers re-
ceiving a reduction of 6 percent or more in monthly mortgage payments 
through HAMP “if the borrower remains in good standing (defined as 
less than three full monthly payments delinquent).” Likewise, success-
ful HAMP-assisted borrowers can earn an annual “pay for performance” 
principal balance reduction payment calculated in the same manner. 160 In 
addition to its voluntary nature, HAMP is quite complicated. HUD and 
Treasury officials administering the program have modified the guidelines 
on numerous occasions during the first months, provoking criticism from 
servicers and advocates for borrowers. 161
 To participate, borrowers must establish hardship, such as income re-
duction or loss, death or serious illness in the family, increase in mortgage 
payments, increase in medical or other expenses, lack of cash reserves, or 
overextension of credit. 162 Eligible borrowers who are current on their mort-
by housing fi nance agencies in states hardest hit by the recession and foreclosure 
crisis. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have been approved for HHF 
assistance.  Id . 
 158. SIGTARP  REPORT ( Jan. 2012),  supra note 153, at 62. 
 159.  Id . 
 160.  Id ., citing Treasury Dept., Supplemental Directive 11-06, Making Home Af-
fordable Program–Updates to Servicer Incentives ( July 7, 2011), www.hmpadmin.
com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd1106.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 161. John W. Schoen,  Flaws Plague Foreclosure Relief Program ,  MSNBC.COM ( Jan. 26, 
2010), http://www.msnbc.com/id/35062033/ns/business-mortgage_mess/ (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2010) (reporting that the Mortgage Bankers Association had tracked 
nine new HAMP program requirement releases and more than ninety clarifi cations 
for new or revised forms, reporting changes, and policies issued between April 2009 
and January 2010). A revised handbook for servicers for the MHA stable of pro-
grams, including HAMP, identifi es thirty-eight supplemental directives released in 
the twenty-eight months between April 2009 and September 2011.  U.S. TREASURY, 
MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES , 
Version 3.4, at 15–17 (Dec. 15, 2011),  retrieved from https://hmpadmin.com/portal/
programs/hamp.jsp (Mar. 31, 2012). 
 162.  HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS ,  supra note 161, at 66–67;  FANNIE MAE SERVICING
GUIDE , Announcement 09-05R, Reissuance of the Introduction of the Home Af-
fordable Modifi cation Program, HomeSaver Forbearance™, and New Workout 
Hierarchy 4 (Apr. 21, 2009),  retrieved from http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/mha/
mhamod/# (Oct. 25, 2010). 
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gages or less than thirty days delinquent must satisfy an “imminent default 
screen,” meaning they must have a debt coverage ratio of less than 1.20 and 
cash reserves of less than three times their first mortgage payment. 163 All 
HAMP-eligible loans must be evaluated with a net present value (NPV) 
test 164 to determine whether a lender’s return from a new loan would be 
more, or less, valuable than the return from taking the old loan through 
foreclosure. 165 The NPV test initially was quite controversial because lend-
ers can deny loan modifications if borrowers fail the test, but Treasury did 
not make available the data that goes into those determinations to bor-
rowers and their representatives. 166 Section 1482 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
added a mandate that Treasury require servicers to make available to bor-
rowers whose mortgage modification applications have been denied “all 
borrower-related and mortgage-related input data used in any net present 
value (NPV) analyses” at the time of denial. 167
 HAMP uses a debt-to-income ratio of 31 percent as a standard of afford-
ability. Participating servicers are required to use what is termed a “stan-
dard modification waterfall,” i.e., a series of proposed modification steps 
in a prescribed order, to reduce a borrower’s monthly mortgage payment 
ratio to the 31 percent level. Capitalization of accrued interest and escrow 
advances to third parties is the first step, followed by interest reduction, 
in increments of .125 percent “to get as close as possible” to the 31 percent 
target, with an interest rate floor of 2.0 percent. If interest reduction does 
not achieve the 31 percent goal, the loan term should be extended by up to 
forty years. If necessary, servicers must offer forbearance, but not forgive-
ness, of principal, structured as a balloon payment that becomes due upon 
“transfer of the property, payoff of the interest bearing UPB, or at maturity 
of the mortgage loan.” 168 Foreclosure counselors report that servicers rarely 
if ever get to the fourth step of principal deferral because they conclude 
that if a modification that reduces the interest rate to 2 percent and extends 
the term to forty years does not achieve the 31 percent debt-to-income ra -
tio, the loan simply is not affordable and further attempts at loan modifica-
tion are unrealistic. 169
 163.  FANNIE MAE SERVICING GUIDE, supra note 162, at 5–6. The debt coverage ratio 
is “the borrower’s monthly disposable net income divided by the borrower’s cur-
rent monthly principal and interest payment on the fi rst mortgage.”  Id . at 5. 
 164.  Id . at 6–7. 
 165. Schoen,  supra note 161. 
 166.  Id. , arguing that “[b]ecause Treasury has kept the formula a secret, hom-
eowners who have been rejected for modifi cations can’t check the lender’s math to 
correct possible mistakes about the borrower’s income, home value, credit score or 
other critical pieces of data.” 
 167. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1482, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2203 ( July 21, 2010);  HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS ,  supra
note 161, at 58–61. 
 168.  HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS ,  supra note 161, at 78–80. 
 169. Ingram,  supra note 1. 
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 The HAMP process involves three steps: application and determina-
tion of eligibility, trial period plan, 170 and permanent modification. Ser-
vicers must use “reasonable efforts” to inform delinquent borrowers of the 
HAMP program and give them an opportunity to apply. Borrowers seek-
ing HAMP modification of their mortgages must first establish eligibility 
by providing detailed financial and hardship information. Servicers are 
encouraged to suspend foreclosure sales while borrowers’ applications are 
evaluated. During the trial payment period, a loan modification plan cre-
ated by applying the “standard modification waterfall” described earlier 
is implemented. Borrowers must make all payments due under the loan 
modification plan. If borrowers successfully complete the trial period plan, 
they may receive a permanent modification “as long as the servicer has 
received . . . all other required documentation from the borrower, including 
a fully executed Modification Agreement.” 171 Permanent loan modification 
terms “remain fixed for at least five years. After five years, the loan’s in-
terest rate. . . . can rise incrementally by up to 1 percent per year” until it 
reaches the interest rate for 30-year fixed-rate loans that was in effect on the 
date the modification became effective. 172
 Despite the fanfare accompanying HAMP’s announcement, the pro-
gram got off to a very slow start. Many borrowers had difficulty producing 
accurate records verifying their income and expenses. The trial payment 
period proved to be insurmountable for large numbers of participants. 173
By August 2010, eighteen months after HAMP was announced, 1.3 million 
trial modifications had been started, but only about 450,000 had success-
fully moved to permanent modifications (more than 468,000 permanent 
modifications were started, but 19,000 already had been cancelled). Over 
660,000 trial modifications had been cancelled and another 202,000 trials re-
mained active, with about 95,000 of those classified as “aged” trials, i.e., ex-
tended to six months or more from the original expectation of three to four 
months. Paperwork problems, missed payments, and primary housing 
expenses of less than 31 percent of income headed the lists of reasons for 
cancellation. Borrowers who were successful in obtaining permanent loan 
modifications enjoyed median savings of $515.49 per month ($1,428.56 be-
fore and $839.21 after modification). All permanent modifications included 
 170. The trial period lasts for three months (“or longer if necessary to comply 
with applicable contractual obligations.”).  HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS ,  supra note 161, 
at 89. 
 171.  Id . at 93–94. 
 172. SIGTARP  REPORT ( Jan. 2012),  supra note 153, at 61–62. 
 173. A major criticism was that borrowers initially were accepted into the trial 
period on the basis of verbal statements. Many could not make even the modifi ed 
payments because their verbal statements did not comport with the reality of their 
situations. Trial period eligibility standards later were changed to require written 
evidence that applicants meet the criteria for entering the trial period phase. In-
gram,  supra note 1. 
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interest rate  reductions; 56.7 percent added extensions to loan terms, and 
29.5 percent also provided for principal forbearance. 174
 HAMP, while increasing its activity, has had great difficulty catching up 
to the volume of foreclosures. For example, during the nine-month period 
from January 1, 2010, through September 30, 2010, almost 2.7 million ho-
meowners received foreclosure notices and banks repossessed more than 
800,000 homes. 175 HAMP’s record of less than 500,000 permanent loan mod-
ifications, and almost half of 1.4 million trial modifications cancelled, paled 
in comparison. Banks reportedly were agreeing to short sales (accepting 
an amount less than the amount of the outstanding mortgage balance) in 
greater numbers. 176 Critics emphasized the slow pace and complexity of 
the HAMP process, 177 as well as the high expectations created by the initial 
announcement that three to four million homeowners would be helped by 
the program, 178 and the loss in credibility that resulted when the early re-
sults fell so far short of the announced target. 179 By December 31, 2011, only 
$2.056 billion of HAMP’s $22.7 billion TARP allocation had been expended 
on 450,000 trial modifications converted to permanent modifications. 180
 174. Making Home Affordable Servicer Performance Report, August 2010 (Sept. 22, 
2010),  retrieved from http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fi nancial-stability/results/
MHA-. . . (Mar. 31, 2012). 
 175. SIGTARP:  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (Oct. 26, 2010),  retrieved from www. 
hmpadmin.com/portal/program/hamp.html (Oct. 27, 2010). 
 176. Dina ElBoghady & Dan Keating,  Walking Away with Less ,  WASH. POST , Sept. 
26, 2010, at A1; Alan Zibel,  Mortgage Relief Is Not Enough for Some ,  ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH , Sept. 23, 2010, at A8. 
 177. Shahien Nasiripour & Arthur Delaney,  Extend and Pretend: The Obama Ad-
ministration’s Failed Foreclosure Program ,  HUFF. POST , Aug. 4, 2010, http://www.
huffi ngtonpost.com/2010/08/04/extend-and-pretend-the-ob_n_668609.html (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2010) (“The strategy has achieved stability for the housing market, 
but not for the people inside the houses. Families are merely given more time to 
wonder when sheriff’s deputies will fi nally pile their belongings on the curb.”). 
 178. The Special Inspector General for TARP was particularly critical of Treasury 
for failing to acknowledge the “implications of these facts with suffi cient transpar-
ency” and for making “the remarkable argument that every single one of these mod-
ifi cations is a success, including the nearly 700,000 that have failed and the more 
than 173,000 that remain in limbo,” SIGTARP  REPORT ( Oct.  2010) ,  supra note 175. 
 179.  HAMP, Servicer Abuses, and Foreclosure Prevention Strategies: Hearing Be-
fore the Cong. Oversight Panel on the Troubled Asset Relied Program Cong. Oversight 
Panel , at 22, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. at 22 (Oct. 27, 2010) (statement of Julia Gordon, 
Senior Policy Counsel, Center for Responsible Lending), http://www.responsi
blelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/congress/testimony-julia-
gordon-10-26-2010.pdf. 
 180. SIGTARP  REPORT ( Jan. 2012),  supra note 153, at 64. A GSE HAMP program 
that does not use TARP funds had converted an additional 480,000 trial modifi -
cations to permanent ones in the same period. In both cases, between 80,000 and 
90,000 permanent loan modifi cations later were cancelled.  Id . 
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 D. Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) 
 An alternative program, announced by the Treasury Department in 
April 2010 offers incentives to servicers to encourage use of alternatives to 
foreclosure such as short sales and deed-in-lieu of foreclosure (DIL) trans-
actions. 181 Short sales are arm’s-length transactions in which participating 
servicers agree to accept the net proceeds of the sale “in full satisfaction of 
the total amount due on the first mortgage,” even though that amount “may 
be less than the total amount due on the mortgage.” 182 The term “deed-in-
lieu of foreclosure” describes a process in which the borrower “voluntarily 
transfers ownership of the mortgaged property to the servicer in full satis-
faction of the total amount due on the first mortgage.” 183 The homeowner’s 
ability to deliver marketable title is a key requirement for servicer partici-
pation, and homeowners usually are required to make “a good faith effort 
to sell the property through a short sale before a DIL will be accepted. 184
 HAFA has been a small program, with only a few thousand closed trans-
actions in the first year of the program, although short sale and DIL trans-
actions increased by 73.7 percent in April 2011 over the previous month. 185
“Low payouts” reportedly hurt the acceptance of the program by servicers, 
investors, and subordinate lien holders. 186 By December 31, 2011, just over 
26,000 short sales or deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure transfers had been com-
pleted, resulting in payments to borrowers, investors, and servicers of 
$99.5 million from the $4.2 billion TARP allocation to this program. 187
 IV. More Aggressive Prevention and Departure Strategies 
 The extent of the mortgage market collapse, 188 the impact of MERS, 189
reports of serious flaws in the foreclosure process, 190 and the inability of 
voluntary governmental programs such as HAMP to make a significant 
 181. U.S. Treasury, Supp. Dir. 09-09 Rev., Home Affordable Foreclosure 
 Alternatives–Short Sale and Deed-in-Lieu of Foreclosure Update (Mar. 26, 2010). 
 182.  Id . at 2. 
 183.  Id . 
 184.  Id . 
 185. Carrie Bay,  HAFA Short Sales up Over 70% in April ,  DSNEWS , http://www.
dsnews.com/articles/hafa-short-sales-up-over-70-in april-2011-06-10. 
 186.  Id . 
 187. SIGTARP  REPORT ( Jan. 2012),  supra note 153, at 70–71. 
 188. So many housing loans are in serious default or foreclosure that in many 
states it could take ten years or longer to clear the backlog. New York is at the ex-
treme of sixty-two years. David Streitfeld,  Backlog of Cases Gives A Reprieve on Fore-
closures , N.Y.  TIMES , June 19, 2011, at 1. 
 189. Section II.B.2.a. 
 190. Dash & Schwartz,  supra note 18 (reporting that “[a]lmost overnight, what 
had been a factory-like business that relied on workers with high school educations 
to process monthly payments needed to come up with a custom-made operation 
that could solve the problems of individual homeowners.”). 
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dent in the foreclosure volume have generated numerous calls for more 
aggressive intervention, including calls for a nationwide moratorium on 
foreclosures. 191
 Financial analysts, economists, and lenders have pushed back against 
moratoria recommendations, arguing that the best way to restore the hous-
ing market is to move the large volume of foreclosures through the legal 
system as quickly as possible. 192 Consumer advocates and others stress the 
importance of preventing foreclosures where possible and easing the tran-
sition of defaulting homeowners when prevention of foreclosure is not pos-
sible. 193 They believe that a successful strategy must include a combination 
of foreclosure prevention techniques (counseling, mediation, loss mitiga-
tion), reform of the mortgage servicer role, and greater emphasis on rental 
housing alternatives. 194
 But intervention is easier said than done. The mortgage market consists 
of millions of private contracts between borrowers and lenders, borrowers 
and servicers, lenders and investors, lenders and servicers, and investors 
 191. H. Res. 344, 112th Cong. (2011), Expressing the sense of the House of Rep-
resentatives that the States should enact a temporary moratorium on residential 
mortgage foreclosures, Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-Ohio), July 8, 2011, http://www.
opencongress.org/bill/112-hr344/text; Sewell Chan,  Treasury Links Foreclosure Ills 
to Lower Housing Prices , N.Y.  TIMES Oct. 28, 2010, at B1 (quoting Julia Gordon of the 
Center for Responsible Lending calling for a “temporary pause” on foreclosures); 
Ariana Eunjung Cha and Jon Gordon,  Most Americans Worry About Ability to Pay 
Mortgage or Rent, Poll Finds , WASH. POST Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/27/AR2010102703683.html?hpid=top
news&sid=ST2010102703800 (reporting poll results including “just over half of the 
country thinks the administration should impose a national moratorium on fore-
closures to sort out whether banks are improperly seizing the homes of struggling 
borrowers”). 
 192.  See, e.g. , Peter J. Wallison , The Foolish Foreclosure Moratorium ,  THE  AMERICAN
(Am. Enter. Inst., Oct. 13, 2010),  retrieved from http://www.american.com/ar-
chive/2010/october/the-foreclosure-mor. . . (Apr. 3, 2012); Caren Bohan & Corbett 
B. Daly,  White House Rejects Foreclosure Moratorium ,  REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2010),  retrieved 
from http://reuters. com/assets/print?aid=USTRE69B3BH20101012 (Apr. 3, 2012). 
 193.  See, e.g. , Prof. Peterson “fi rst priority ‘seed lien’ ” recommendation,  infra
notes 205–06 and 267–68 and accompanying text. Nobel Prize-winning econo-
mist Joseph Stiglitz was a proponent of a temporary foreclosure moratorium in 
2010, arguing that “the bad practices were so rife, the inequities were so rife, the 
fraudulent behavior was so common, that at this point we don’t know what is a 
valid mortgage or not. And the consequences of throwing somebody out of their 
home, when they shouldn’t be, are hard to reverse.” Amy Goodman,  Nobel Laure-
ate Joseph Stiglitz: Foreclosure Moratorium, Government Stimulus Needed to Revive U.S. 
Economy ,Transcript of Interview (Oct. 20, 2010),  retrieved from http://www.democ
racynow.org/2010/10/20/nobel_laurate_joseph_stiglitz (Apr. 3, 2012). 
 194. Among organizations that have advanced these recommendations are the 
Center for American Progress, the Center for Responsible Lending, and the National 
Consumer Law Center. 
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and servicers. Sanctity of contract is one of the pillars of our capitalistic 
system, as Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution makes clear. 195
 That courts will protect private contracts from interference by the gov-
ernment was reaffirmed in  United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey , 196 in which 
the Supreme Court applied the Contract Clause to invalidate a 1974 New 
Jersey statute repealing a 1962 statutory bond covenant between the states 
of New Jersey and New York limiting the ability of the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey to subsidize rail passenger transportation from 
revenues and reserves. In concluding that the Contract Clause prohibits 
the retroactive repeal of the 1962 covenant, the Court stated that “a State 
cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial obligations simply because it 
would prefer to spend the money to promote the public good rather than 
the private welfare of its creditors.” 197
 The Contract Clause, however, is not an absolute bar to public interven-
tion in private contractual relations. The state police power has been used 
successfully to override private contracts in times of severe financial stress or 
other emergencies. 198 The leading case is  Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blais-
dell , 199 in which the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute 200 imposing a 
two-year moratorium on foreclosure sales at the height of the Great Depres-
sion that, among other provisions, authorized state courts to grant default-
ing mortgagors extra time to redeem their property following foreclosure 
and allow them to retain possession during the redemption period so long as 
they paid a reasonable income or rental value to the mortgagee. In uphold-
ing the statute as a valid exercise of the state’s police power, the Court stated 
 While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occa-
sion for the exercise of power. . . . The constitutional question presented 
in the light of an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the 
particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions. . . . The policy 
of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of 
a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile—a 
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good 
order of society. 
 . . . .  
 195.  U.S. CONST. , Art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . .”). 
 196. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 197.  Id . at 29. 
 198. During the Great Depression, twenty-seven of the then forty-eight states 
adopted foreclosure moratoria. David C. Wheelock,  Changing the Rules: State Mort-
gage Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great Depression ,  REVIEW 569, 575 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Nov./Dec. 2008), http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/ 
review/08/11/Wheelock.pdf. 
 199. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 200. Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, Ch. 339, Laws of Minn. 1933, at 514, 
approved Apr, 18, 1933. The law was to remain in effect “only during the continu-
ance of the emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935.” 
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 It cannot be maintained that the constitutional prohibition should be so 
construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect 
to the enforcement of contracts if made necessary by a great public calamity 
such as fire, flood, or earthquake. . . . And if state power exists to give tempo-
rary relief from the enforcement of contracts in the presence of disasters due 
to physical causes such as fire, flood or earthquake, that power cannot be 
said to be non-existent when the urgent public need demanding such relief 
is produced by other and economic causes. 201
 With the prospect of as many as 13 million foreclosures by 2014, 202 the 
current foreclosure crisis would appear to meet the Supreme Court’s public 
purpose standard for use of the police power to override contract provi-
sions. Representative Kaptur included specific reference to  Blaisdell in her 
proposed House resolution calling for the president to declare a national 
foreclosure emergency and for the states to enact moratoria similar to Min-
nesota’s two-year moratorium upheld in  Blaisdell . 203
 Intervention policies may be grouped into four categories for discus-
sion purposes: (1) foreclosure response, (2) land records modernization, (3) 
rental housing alternatives, and (4) the future of the GSEs. While categori-
zation may simplify analytical organization, it also risks masking the inter-
related nature of the elements of any intervention strategy. 
 A. Foreclosure Responses—Prevention as an Ideal 
 The enormity of the foreclosure crisis 204 and the difficulties voluntary 
programs such as HAMP have encountered have led consumer advocates 
and others to focus on more aggressive foreclosure prevention strategies. 
Professor Christopher Peterson, in written testimony to the House Judi-
ciary Committee, 205 offered a number of recommendations for intervention 
or lack thereof by Congress, including congressional prohibition of GSE 
(Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae) purchase of “MERS-recorded 
loans,” congressional resistance to calls for federal preemption legislation 
to shield MERS from state commercial and property laws, congressional 
provision of “block grants to county governments to upgrade their record-
ing technology in return for adopting uniform standards” for recording 
and searching public land records, and congressional enactment of “emer-
gency legislation . . . [establishing] a first priority ‘seed’ lien” of $15,000 
payable to the departing family from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. 206
 201.  Home Building & Loan , 290 U.S. at 426, 435, 439–40. 
 202. Gordon Testimony,  supra note 179, at 3 (citing Hatzius & Marschoun,  supra
note 15, at 16 (projecting 13 million foreclosures). 
 203. H. Res. 344,  supra note191. 
 204. Gordon Testimony,  supra note 179, at 3. 
 205.  Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary , 111th Cong. (2010) (written statement of Christopher L. Peterson, Assoc. 
Dean and Prof. of Law, Univ. of Utah),  available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hear
ings/pdf/Peterson101215.pdf. 
 206.  Id . 
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 The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) has been a leading proponent of 
a “temporary pause” in foreclosures, arguing that taking “defined, objective, 
and transparent measures . . . to ensure the integrity of the system is the best 
way to stabilize the market.” 207 Stating “[i]t is time to take the gloves off,” Julia 
Gordon, CRL’s Senior Policy Counsel, urged “everyone concerned about the 
stability of the housing market and the sustainability of our economic recov-
ery to address the foreclosure problem head-on with every tool available.” 208
But given the uncertainty surrounding the impact of a nationwide foreclosure 
moratorium on the fragile housing sector, steps short of that can and should 
be taken, many of which are included in CRL’s recommendations. 209
 CRL has recommended devoting more resources to foreclosure counsel-
ing, requiring lenders and loan servicers to cooperate in good faith with 
foreclosure counselors, strictly enforcing state foreclosure notice and proce-
dure laws, imposing mandatory loss mitigation requirements as precondi-
tions to foreclosure, 210 requiring lenders and loan servicers to participate in 
good faith in foreclosure mediation efforts, authorizing state-level foreclo-
sure moratoria where warranted by extreme circumstances, and enacting 
legislation authorizing bankruptcy courts to modify mortgages on principal 
residences in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings in the same way that cur-
rent law permits restructuring of loans for vacation and investment homes. 211
 1. Foreclosure Counseling 
 Foreclosure counseling can be extremely effective in helping dis-
tressed homeowners remain in their homes, particularly if those hom-
eowners can obtain counseling while they still remain current on their 
loan obligations. 212 Counselors can help borrowers understand their sit-
uations, particularly the serious consequences of foreclosure. They can 
explain the available alternatives and help their borrower clients contact 
 207. Gordon Testimony,  supra note 179, at 3. 
 208.  Id . at 4. 
 209.  Id . at 9–15. 
 210. Sara Weed & Sonia Garrison,  Foreclosure as a Last Resort: States Can Stabilize 
the Housing Market by Preventing Unnecessary Foreclosures , CRL  POL ’ Y BRIEF at 7 (Oct. 
2010) (recommending loss mitigation “as a fl exible but effective tool for states”). 
There are four ways in which a loss mitigation component has been integrated, 
either implicitly or explicitly, into state foreclosure laws: (1) as a precondition to 
foreclosure fi ling, (2) as part of a foreclosure mediation program, (3) as a precondi-
tion to foreclosure sale, and (4) as the basis for a challenge post-foreclosure sale.  Id . 
Acknowledging that “not all foreclosures are preventable,” CRL argued that “this 
range of approaches . . . would ensure that the foreclosure sale is a last resort.”  Id . at 
7–8.  211. In its policy brief  Common-Sense Solutions Are Within Reach (Dec. 12, 2008), 
CLR reported that Congress was considering legislation (H.R. 3609/S. 2136) that 
would extend the loan restructuring authority to families in Chapter 13 proceedings 
who were on the verge of losing their homes. 
 212. A study of foreclosure counseling by a task force in the St. Louis area con-
cluded that “[h]omeowners who were current on their loan [at the time of  counseling] 
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lenders and loan servicers to discuss those alternatives. Counselors also 
can help borrowers pull together necessary documentation of their loan 
histories and assist them in completing loan modification applications. 
 The Bush administration’s HOPE NOW Alliance 213 began a collabora-
tive counseling program in January 2008. Later that year sections 2305 and 
2401 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) appropri-
ated $180 million for housing counseling services, including loss mitigation 
counseling. 214 The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling (NFMC) 
program, administered by NeighborWorks® (NW America), was estab-
lished to distribute these funds to “competitively selected Grantee organi-
zations [such as Beyond Housing in St. Louis], which in turn provide the 
counseling services, either directly or through Subgrantee organizations.” 215
 A cluster of studies by the Federal Reserve, 216 the Urban Institute, 217 the 
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 218 and the National 
Council on Aging 219 document impressive results gained by foreclosure 
counselors: 200 percent increase in the likelihood of obtaining a loan modi-
fication with lower monthly payments and lower interest rates (average 
of $110/month and five basis points, respectively); 220 homeowners more 
likely to be able to cure serious delinquencies or avoid foreclosure; and 
homeowners more likely to remain current on their new loans. 221 Growing 
were likely to sustain homeownership.” Will Winter & Todd Swanstrom,  THE EF-
FECTIVENESS OF FORECLOSURE COUNSELING IN ST. LOUIS: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE METRO
ST. LOUIS FORECLOSURE INTERVENTION TASK FORCE AND BEYOND HOUSING 18 (Pub. Pol’y 
Research Ctr., Univ. of Mo.-St. Louis, Mar. 15, 2010). 
 213. HOPE NOW Alliance,  supra notes 118–38 and accompanying text. 
 214. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, Title III, 
§ 2305 and Title VI, § 2401, 122 Stat. 2654. 
 215.  CHARLES A. CALHOUN ET AL, NATIONAL FORECLOSURE MITIGATION COUNSELING
PROGRAM EVALUATION: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM EFFECTS, SEPTEMBER 2010 UP-
DATE , at 1 (2010), http://www.urban.org/publications/412276.html. 
 216. Maximilian D. Schmeiser,  The Effects of Foreclosure Counseling for Distressed 
Homeowners , Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, June 21, 2011. 
 217. Peter A. Tatian, Kenneth Temken, Neil S. Mayer & Charles Calhoun,  Na-
tional Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program Evaluation: Does Foreclosure Counsel-
ing Help Troubled Homeowners? (Urban Inst., Nov. 2009), http://www.995hope.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Urban_Institute_Study.pdf. 
 218. Chris Herbert,  Housing Counseling: Past and Future Trends ( Joint Ctr. for 
Housing Studies of Harvard Univ., June 21, 2010), https://secure.ahcoa.org/ 
resources/index/news/AHCOA_110622_99.pdf. 
 219. Barbara R. Stucki,  HECM Reverse Mortgage Counseling: Critical for Consumer 
Protection (Nat’l Council on Aging, June 21, 2011). 
 220. Schmeiser,  supra note 216, at 11–12; Carrie Bay,  Independent Research Studies 
Validate Benefi ts of Mortgage Counseling ,  DSNEWS , June 24, 2011, http://www.dsnews.
com/articles/print-view/independent-research-studies-validate-benefi t. . . (report-
ing Federal Reserve study fi ndings). 
 221. Tatian et al,  supra note 217, at 5–7 (reporting results of Urban Institute 
 research). 
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affordability problems are likely to increase the need for counseling, 222 and 
seniors need counseling to consider the pros and cons of home equity con-
version mortgages (HECM), also known as reverse mortgages. 223
 NW America engaged the Urban Institute to evaluate the first two years 
of the program (Rounds 1 and 2). In doing so, the Urban Institute reviewed 
approximately 180,000 loans of borrowers who received NFMC counseling 
and 155,000 loans of borrowers who did not receive counseling. 224 In a pre-
liminary analysis of the activity between January 2008 and December 2009, 
the Urban Institute concluded that counseling 
 raised the cure rate for loans being modified, preparing more loans for 
cure-and-sustain outcomes, increased the size of the reduction in mortgage 
payment in modified and cured loans, with a resulting positive impact on 
sustainability, and raised sustainability of modified and cured loans addi-
tionally outside of the effect on loan payment level, presumably through 
financial counseling and some limited financial assistance. 225
 Homeowners who obtained NFMC counseling after receiving foreclo-
sure notices “had a relatively likelihood of curing their foreclosure that 
was 1.7 times greater than if they had not received counseling from NFMC 
grant recipients,” Urban Institute researchers concluded. 226
 More counseling resources are needed, 227 though, as a “log-jam” of cli-
ents has been created by the substantial disconnect between the number of 
homeowners receiving trial loan modifications under HAMP and the ex-
tremely small number who then receive permanent modifications, leading 
to “soaring” increases in client loads. 228 In addition, the voluntary nature 
of HAMP and other federal initiatives “have placed strong responsibilities 
on . . . local counselors to advocate for mortgage modifications, but very 
little control over the rest of the modification process to ensure equitable 
solutions for homeowners.” 229
 222. Herbert,  supra note 218, at 12. 
 223. Stucki,  supra note 219. 
 224.  CALHOUN ET AL ,  supra note 215, at 2. 
 225.  Id . at 63–64. 
 226.  Id . at 65. 
 227. NeighborWorks America announced the fi fth round of counseling funding 
on June 7, 2011, with awards totaling $67.7 million to 138 state and local counseling 
agencies. Eligible applicants had sought more than $212 million. NeighborWorks 
America, NFMC Round 5 Counseling Funds ( June 7, 2011), http://www.nw.org/
network/foreclosure/nfmcp/round5.asp ( June 27, 2011). An additional award of 
$73.8 million to go to “32 state housing fi nance agencies, 18 HUD-approved hous-
ing counseling intermediaries, and 86 community-based NeighborWorks organi-
zations” was announced Mar. 19, 2012. Esther Cho,  Foreclosure Counseling Agencies 
to Receive $73.8M , DSNEWS ,  retrieved from http://www.dsnews.com/articles/print-
view/foreclosure-counseling-agencies-to-receive-738m-2012-03-20 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
 228. For example, Beyond Housing, a nonprofi t loan counselor in St. Louis, saw 
its caseload increase from about 100 clients in April 2008 to 935 clients in July 2009.
Winter & Swanstrom,  supra note 212, at 21. 
 229.  Id . 
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 2. Mandatory Loss Mitigation 
 Loss mitigation has a long common law tradition. If someone breaches 
a contract to buy my goods, I must attempt to sell those goods to someone 
else before I can collect damages for the breach. 230 The loss mitigation prin-
ciple applies also to contracts for the sale of real property, although the tra-
ditional willingness of courts to consider damages inadequate for breach of 
contracts to sell land makes specific performance the favored remedy. 231 In 
recent years, the mitigation doctrine has been extended to residential leases 
and, increasingly, to commercial leases. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Texas, in  Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc. , 232 noted that 
forty-two states and the District of Columbia had accepted the argument 
that the contractual aspect of a lease included the duty to make reasonable 
efforts to mitigate damages caused by a tenant’s breach. 233 In addition to 
the contract logic, the court identified several public policy reasons for ex-
tending the loss mitigation rule to leases: 
 First, requiring mitigation . . . discourages economic waste and encourages 
productive use of the property. . . . Second, a mitigation rule helps prevent 
destruction of or damage to the leased property. . . . Third, the mitigation 
rule is consistent with the trend disfavoring contract penalties. 234
 Mortgage loans resemble leases in the sense that both are contracts as 
well as conveyances of property interests: the tenant’s right to possession 
and the mortgagee’s right to dispossess the mortgagor upon default. The 
policies of discouraging economic waste and preventing destruction of, or 
damage to, property apply with equal or greater force to mortgage loans. 
 The Center for Responsible Lending has identified several levels of eco-
nomic loss occasioned by the foreclosure crisis “[b]eyond the impact of the 
foreclosures on the families losing their homes,” including 
 . . . “spillover” costs to neighbors and communities are massive, [as much as] 
$1.86 trillion in lost wealth, which represents an average loss of over $20,000 
for each of the 91.5 million houses affected. . . . [F]oreclosures cost states 
 230. “The mitigation principle is at the root of many of the rules of the law of 
damages.”  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 57.11, at 302 (rev. ed. 2005). 
Technically, I may have no duty to mitigate damages, but if I do not make a reason-
able attempt to do so, my ability to recover damages will be severely compromised. 
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (recoverable damages are “less . . . any cost 
or other loss that [the injured person] has avoided by not having to perform). For 
a review of the mitigation doctrine and an argument that it should be applied to 
liquidated damages clauses, see Lisa A. Fortin,  Note: Why There Should be a Duty to 
Mitigate Liquidated Damages Clauses , 38  HOFSTRA L. REV. 285 (2009). 
 231.  See, e.g. , Giannini v. First Nat’l Bank of Des Plaines, 483 N.E.2d 924, 933 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 1985) (“Illinois courts have long held that where the parties have fairly and 
understandingly entered into a valid contract for the sale of real property, specifi c 
performance of the contract is a matter of right . . .”). 
 232. 948 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1997). 
 233.  Id . at 296. 
 234.  Id . at 298. 
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and localities enormous sums of money in lost tax revenue and increased 
costs for fire, police, and other services because vacant homes attract crime, 
arson, and squatters, [resulting in] an average of $19,229 in direct costs to the 
local government [for each foreclosure] . . . While tenants now have some 
legal protection against immediate eviction, most of them will ultimately be 
forced to leave their homes. 235
 State law controls the foreclosure process. As Julia Gordon of the Center 
for Responsible Lending emphasized in her testimony before the Congres-
sional Oversight Panel, “states can require that servicers assess whether 
foreclosure is in the financial interest of the investor before proceeding 
to foreclosure.” 236 She argued that a mandatory loss mitigation standard 
can function like the NPV test of HAMP 237 by requiring loan servicers to 
“weigh the investor’s cost of foreclosure against the investor’s anticipated 
cash flow from future modified mortgage payments” 238 in order to de-
termine whether foreclosure is in the best interest of the parties. She rec-
ommended that states require loan servicers to perform a loss mitigation 
analysis “prior to filing for foreclosure,” noting that states have added loss 
mitigation requirements at several stages of the foreclosure process: “(1) as 
a pre-condition to foreclosure filing; 239 (2) as part of a foreclosure mediation 
program; 240 (3) as a pre-condition to foreclosure sale; 241 and (4) as the basis 
for a challenge to a post-foreclosure sale.” 242
 The mortgage servicing business administering commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) features two servicers, a “primary servicer,” 
which focuses “solely on transaction processing,” and a “special ser-
vicer . . . responsible only for defaulted loans . . . [which] is compensated 
based on the return on the defaulted loans,” in effect, a “loss mitigation 
specialist.” 243
 Applying the loss mitigation concept to mortgage loans would not 
amount to an unconstitutional impairment of contract. Rather, it would 
be an acknowledgment that foreclosure and sale is a drastic remedy that 
should be utilized only as a last resort. In many cases, investors likely will 
 235. Gordon Testimony,  supra note 179, at 5–6, citing Center for Responsible 
Lending,  Soaring Spillover: Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billion in 
2009 Alone; 69.5 Million Homes Lose $7,200 on Average; Over Next Four Years, 91.5 Mil-
lion Families to Lose $1.9 Trillion in Home Value; $20,300 on Average (May 2009),  avail-
able at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/
soaring-spillover-3-. 
 236.  Id . at 16. 
 237.  Id . at 16–17. 
 238.  Id . at 17. 
 239.  Id . at 17, citing Maryland HB 472(2010). 
 240.  Id . 
 241.  Id . 
 242.  Weed & Garrison, supra note 210. 
 243. Levitin & Twomey,  supra note 67, at 86. 
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receive greater value through loan modifications such as interest reduction, 
term extension, and/or principal reduction than through foreclosure and 
sale of the property, not to mention the benefits borrowers and their neigh-
bors will receive from avoiding foreclosure. 
 The National Mortgage Settlement filed on March 12, 2012, adopts many 
of these principles. 244 For example, the bank signatories are required “to 
notify potentially eligible borrowers of currently available loss mitigation 
options  prior to foreclosure referral .” 
 Servicer[s] shall offer and facilitate loan modifications for borrowers  rather 
than initiate foreclosure (author’s emphasis) when such loan modifications for 
which they are eligible are net present value (NPV) positive and meet other 
investor, guarantor, insurer and program requirements. . . .  
 . . . .  
 If a borrower has not already been referred to foreclosure, Servicer shall 
not refer an eligible borrower’s account to foreclosure  while the borrower’s 
complete application is pending if Servicer received . . . a complete loan modifi-
cation application no later than day 120 of delinquency. . . . 245
 Of course, it is one thing to settle a complicated dispute and another thing 
to implement that settlement. 246 Participating state attorneys general have 
committed to play a major role in monitoring the implementation of this 
agreement. 247 Time will tell whether this settlement really is a breakthrough 
agreement or merely a first step at fixing an industrywide problem. 248
 3. Automatic Foreclosure Mediation 
 Foreclosure counselors such as Linda Ingram at Beyond Housing stress 
the value of mediation as a mechanism to enable stakeholders in the resi-
dential mortgage finance market to “come together to talk about the best 
way for all parties to resolve foreclosures quickly and effectively.” 249 The 
 244. United States v. Bank of America Corp., Case 1:12-cv-00361-RMC, doc. 1–4 
(Mar. 12, 2012) (consent judgment),  retrieved from http://www.nationalmortgageset
tlement.com/about-the-settlement (Mar. 24, 2012). 
 245.  Id . at Exh. A-16 (author’s emphasis). 
 246. For example, a landmark affordable housing agreement in 2009 to settle a 
fair housing complaint against Westchester County, New York, “has led to an often 
rancorous tug of war.” Peter Applebome,  In Westchester, Doubts on Commitment to a 
Housing Deal ,  N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2012, at A15. 
 247.  See, e.g. , Missouri Attorney General, Mortgage Settlement Agreement In-
formation 2 (“State AG oversight of national banks for the fi rst time”),  retrieved from
http://ago.mo.gov/mortgageSettlementInfo.htm (Mar. 5, 2012). 
 248.  See, e.g. , Jessica Silver-Greenberg,  As Foreclosure Problems Persist, Fed Seeks 
More Fines ,  N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 2, 2012, at B1 (reporting Federal Reserve offi cial’s recom-
mendation that fi nes be levied against eight additional fi nancial institutions). 
 249. Alon Cohen,  Walk the Talk: Best Practices on the Road to Automatic Foreclo-
sure Mediation , at 1 (Ctr. for Am. Progress 2010), http://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/2010/11/walk_the_talk.html.  Walk the Talk is the third in a four-part 
series of papers, all published by the Center for American Progress, on foreclosure 
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Center for American Progress (CAP), a progressive think tank advocat-
ing foreclosure mediation, reported in June, 2010 that twenty-one states 
were sponsoring foreclosure mediation programs, ten of which were es-
tablished in the previous twelve months. Since that time, five additional 
states have established foreclosure mediation programs, bringing the total 
to twenty-six states. 250 Benefits of foreclosure mediation cited by CAP in-
clude avoidance of lengthy delays occasioned by the volume of cases in 
 mediation. Others in the series are Andrew Jakabovics & Alon Cohen,  It’s Time We 
Talked: Mandatory Mediation in the Foreclosure Process (2009), http://www.american-
progress.org/issues/2009/06/time_we_talked.html; Alon Cohen & Andrew Jak-
abovics,  Now We’re Talking: A Look at Current State-Based Foreclosure Mediation Pro-
grams and How to Bring Them to Scale (2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2010/06/foreclosure_mediation.html; and Alon Cohen,  Talking It Up: How 
the Federal Government Can Implement Automatic Foreclosure Mediation to Help Hom-
eowners, Lenders, Investors, and Taxpayers (2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2011/01/talking_it_up.html. 
 250. Cohen & Jakabovics,  Now We’re Talking, supra note 249, at 1. The states offer-
ing foreclosure mediation include: 
 •  California:  CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (2008) 
 •  Colorado:  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN . § 38-38-102.5 (foreclosure hotline) 
 •  Connecticut:  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-31m (2008) 
 •  Delaware: Admin. Dir. No. 2009-3, Del. Supr. Ct., Vaughn, P.J. (Aug. 31, 
2009) 
 •  Florida: Admin. Order No. AOSC09-54,  Final Report and Recommendations 
on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases , Fla. Supreme Ct., Quince, C.J. 
(Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.fl oridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/docu-
ments/AOSC09-54_Foreclosures.pdf 
 •  Hawaii: Mortgage Foreclosure-Appropriation, 2011 Hawaii Laws Act 48 
(S.B. 651) 
 •  Illinois: Admin. Ord. No. 2010-01,  Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Pro-
gram , Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. Div. of Chancery, Kinnard, 
P.J. (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.suffredin.org/pdfs/Foreclosure.Ad-
ministrativeOrder.2010-01.pdf; Christopher Bonjean,  Justice Killbride, 
Chief Judge Kinney Announce New Foreclosure Mediation Program for Will 
County , Ill. State Bar Ass’n ( June 7, 2010), http://www.illinoislawyer
now.com/2010/06/07/justice-kilbride-judge-kinney-announce - new-
foreclosure-mediation-program-for-will-county/ 
 •  Indiana:  IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-30-10.5 et seq. 
 •  Iowa: Information on Iowa Mediation Service’s Mortgage Mediation Pro-
gram, Iowa Mediation Services, http://www.iowamediationservice.com/ 
(foreclosure hotline and voluntary mediation services) 
 •  Kentucky (single jurisdiction), Admin. Order No. 2009-09-03, Residential 
Foreclosure Conciliation Program (Mar. 2009) ( Jefferson County), dis-
cussed in  EMILY SPURLOCK, COLLEEN KENNEDY, CARLOS LOPES & MIKE CLARK , 
 HOUSING FORECLOSURES IN KENTUCKY RESEARCH REPORT NO. 365 ( July 9, 2009), 
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/RR365.pdf 
 •  Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 
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the formal foreclosure pipelines, reduction in administration and carrying 
costs for servicers as over seventy percent of mediated cases have resulted 
in settlements, homeowners can remain in their homes by negotiating 
“sustainable modification[s]” or can negotiate a “ ‘graceful’ exit that can 
give [them] some say in the move out as well as assistance in  transitioning 
 •  Maine:  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.4, § 18-B (2009);  Judicial Branch Commission on 
Foreclosure Diversion , State of Maine Judicial Branch Courts, www.courts.
state.me.us/committees/foreclosure.html 
 •  Massachusetts:  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 35A (amended 2010) 
 •  Michigan:  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3204 et seq. 
 •  Nevada: Foreclosure Mediation Rules Including Amendments through 
Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/images/foreclosure/
adkt435_amendedrules.pdf 
 •  New Hampshire: Offi ce of Mediation and Arbitration. The Foreclosure 
 Mediation Program was discontinued on Oct. 26, 2011,  retrieved from
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/adrp/foreclosure/index.htm (Apr. 2, 
2012) 
 •  New Jersey: Press Release, New Jersey Courts, Judiciary Announces Fore-
closure Mediation Program to Assist Homeowners at Risk of Losing Their 
Homes (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2008/
pr081016c.htm 
 •  New Mexico (single jurisdiction): Admin. Order No. 2009-00001,  In re Fore-
closure Mediation ADR Option, First Judicial Dist. Ct., State of New Mex-
ico, Pfeffer, C.J. (Apr. 30, 2009, modifi ed July 8,2009), http://www.fi rstdis
trictcourt.com/Forms/pdf/Admin%20Order%203.pdf (Los Alamos, Rio 
Arriba, and Santa Fe Counties) 
 •  New York: N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3408 (2009). 
 •  Ohio (multiple jurisdictions):  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.06 (2010) 
(“In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage, the court may at any 
stage in the action require the mortgagor and the mortgagee to partici-
pate in mediation as the court considers appropriate and may include 
a stipulation that requires the mortgagor and the mortgagee to appear 
at the mediation in person.”); Supreme Court of Ohio, Foreclosure 
Mediation Program Model (Apr. 14, 2008), http://www.nclc.org/im
ages/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/foreclosure_med_prog_by_state/
ohio_prgm_model.pdf.; Foreclosure Mediation, Cuyahoga County 
Common Pleas Ct., http://cp.cuyahogacounty.us/internet/ForeClo
sureMediation.aspx 
 •  Oregon: 2009 Oregon Laws Ch. 864 (S.B. 628), http://www.leg.state.
or.us/09reg/measures/sb0600.dir/sb0628.en.html 
 •  Pennsylvania (multiple jurisdictions): Jnt. Court Reg. No. 2008-01, 
Ct. of Common Pleas of Philadelphia Cnty., Jones, P.J., and Keogh, 
A.J. (Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.courtsphila.gov/pdf/regs/2008/
cpjgcr-2008-01.pdf 
 •  Rhode Island (multiple jurisdictions): Code of Ordinances of the City 
of Providence, http://library.municode.com/HTML/11458/level3/PII_
C13_AX_s13-216 
 •  Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4633 (2009) 
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to new housing.” 251 Governments can benefit as successful mediation 
“ reduces home vacancies, stabilizes government income from property 
tax, and serves as a review and appeal” of federal and state foreclosure 
relief programs. 252
 The fact that mediation is a voluntary process of negotiation can lead to 
concerns that it would not work on the scale required by the foreclosure 
crisis. Lenders/servicers may not see how mediation can be in their best 
interests, or may be so overwhelmed by the sheer number of cases in their 
portfolios that the prospect of submitting such cases to mediation leaves 
them cold. Consumer advocates may fear that foreclosure mediators will tilt 
in favor of lenders because borrowers have defaulted on their contractual 
obligations. Such reactions, understandable as they may be, are highly sub-
jective and even emotional. The Center for American Progress’s recommen-
dation 253 that an automatic mediation component be added to the foreclosure 
process makes sense. The term “automatic” is less emotionally charged than 
the term “mandatory,” and it introduces a more objective approach to the 
process. Adding the requirement that lenders/servicers demonstrate good 
faith participation in mediation as a condition to pursuit of foreclosure does 
not require them to accept unrealistic or unfair loan modifications or for-
bearance, but it does require them to consider objectively what alternatives 
may be in their best interests. Making mediation automatic introduces a 
degree of standardization to what has been an ad hoc and chaotic process. 
 Automatic foreclosure mediation can serve as a proxy for the type of 
individual evaluation local banks traditionally gave their borrowers. Jamie 
Dimon, C.E.O. of JPMorgan Chase, acknowledged to Roger Lowenstein of 
the  New York Times Magazine that the “optimal way to deal with delinquent 
loans would be to evaluate customers one at a time.” But local banks largely 
have given way to gigantic financial institutions, and personal service has 
for the most part been replaced with computerized responses to 800- number 
phone calls. The mass production of mortgages that took place earlier in 
the decade and the sheer number of borrowers who have defaulted on 
those mortgages caused Mr. Dimon to acknowledge that management of 
the resulting chaos “is way beyond the capacity of the machine.” 254
 •  Washington: Wash. Ch. 58 Laws of 2011 (H.B. 1362), http://apps.leg.
wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Law%20
2011/1362-S2.SL.pdf 
 •  Wisconsin: Frequently Asked Questions , Marquette University Law 
School, http://law.marquette.edu/foreclosure/lender-faqs.html (describ-
ing voluntary mediation program run by Marquette University Law 
Clinic) 
 251. Cohen,  Walk the Talk, supra note 249, at 2. 
 252.  Id . 
 253.  Id . at 3. 
 254. Roger Lowenstein,  America’s Least Hated Banker ,  N.Y. TIMES MAG. 34, 41 (Dec. 5, 
2010). 
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 One of the key changes in servicer practices recommended by the National 
Consumer Law Center and others is that servicers should establish one point 
of contact for borrowers in default/foreclosure situations. Both Treasury and 
Fannie Mae have promulgated “single point of contact” requirements: Trea-
sury for servicers participating in the HAMP and HAFA programs; 255 Fannie 
Mae for “all conventional mortgage loans held in Fannie Mae’s portfolio,” as 
well as loans packaged into mortgage-backed securities. 256 In a sense, auto-
matic mediation fulfills the single point of contact function by insuring that 
borrowers facing foreclosure can sit down across a table with a flesh-and-
blood representative of the loan servicer contemplating foreclosure. 257
 Foreclosure mediation is not a perfect system. As experience with 
farmer-lender mediation during the farm crisis of the 1980s, 258 as well as 
with court-ordered mediation 259 and contract-sanctioned arbitration or me-
diation teaches, 260 issues of mediator competence and objectivity, fairness, 
and transparency can arise. 261 Whether mediators should take a “broad” or 
a “narrow” approach can produce tension. 262 Mediators using the “broad” 
approach are open “to dealing with whatever issues are important to the 
 255. U.S. Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program–Single Point of Con-
tact for Borrower Assistance, Supp. Directive 11-04 (May 18, 2011), https://www. 
hmpadmin.com//portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd1104.pdf. 
 256. Fannie Mae, Delinquency Management and Default Prevention, Announce-
ment SVC-2011-08 ( June 6, 2011). 
 257. Not everyone is happy with the specifi cs of the announced one point-of-
contact rules. Alon Cohen, in a posting for the Center for American Progress, stated 
that “under the bank’s proposed terms the single point of contact can be more than 
one person.” Alon Cohen,  Federal Mortgage Servicing Settlement Scoops States: Fed-
eral Deal Over Fraud Allegations Could Leave States with Fewer Options , Ctr. for Am. 
Progress, Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/mort
gage_servicing.html. 
 258. For discussion of the use of mediation during that period, see  LEONARD L. 
RISKIN, THE FARMER-LENDER MEDIATION PROGRAM: IMPLEMENTATION BY THE FARMERS HOME
ADMINISTRATION (Administrative Conference of the United States 1991). Recommen-
dations from the report were adopted by the Administrative Conference. Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States Recommendation 91-7, C.F.R. 305.91-7 
(1991).  See also Leonard L. Riskin,  Two Concepts of Mediation in the FmHA’s Farmer-
Lender Mediation Program , 45  ADMIN. L. REV. 21 (1993). 
 259. For a discussion of the growth of court-ordered mediation and correspond-
ing questions of fairness and transparency this growth raises, see Tracy Walters Mc-
Cormack, Susan Schultz & James McCormack,  Probing the Legitimacy of Mandatory 
Mediation: New Roles for Judges, Mediators, and Lawyers , 1  ST. MARY ’ S J. LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE & ETHICS 150 (2011). 
 260. Contract mediation refers to the increasingly common practice of including 
a clause in standard-form contracts that provides for arbitration and/or mediation 
of disputes in lieu of litigation. The author and his wife signed such a contract when 
purchasing new windows for their home in June 2011. 
 261. McCormack et al.,  supra note 259. 
 262. Riskin,  Two Concepts of Mediation, supra note 258, at 44–56. 
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resolution of the difficulties between the borrower and the lenders.” 263 For 
the “narrow” approach, the “principal—and sometimes the exclusive—
issue is whether the creditors will adjust their debts. . . .” 264
 Foreclosure mediation, which has its roots in mediation between farmers 
and lenders, is less concerned with being an alternative to litigation and more 
concerned with giving borrowers “face-to-face” access to a decision maker. 
Once access has been gained, the results have been quite  impressive—on 
average, approximately 70 percent of the mediated cases have resulted in 
settlements satisfactory to the parties. 265 In addition, mediation has been 
shown to cut the length of the foreclosure process by more than half—from 
an average of 200 days for nonjudicial foreclosures and 270 days for judicial 
foreclosures to approximately 100 days for mediation. 266
 4. Easing the Departure of Defaulting Families 
 Although a substantial number of families may be able to keep their 
homes through sophisticated and objective analysis of the alternatives 
to foreclosure, a large number will not. Some have fallen too far behind 
on payments to have any hope of catching up, others took on unrealis-
tic amounts of debt when purchasing or refinancing their homes, and still 
others should not have attempted homeownership in the first place. Me-
diation can help such families confront their situations and prepare for the 
inevitable move to new housing—rental or more affordable ownership. 
 A creative idea suggested by Professor Peterson in his written testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee would allocate the first $15,000 from 
the proceeds of a foreclosure sale to the owner-occupied borrowers who are 
losing their home through the foreclosure proceedings. 267 Patterned after 
“the informal ‘cash-for-keys’ policies the smartest lenders have used for 
generations,” the program would be structured as a “temporary emergency 
homestead exemption,” not unlike the traditional homestead exemption 
some states still recognize as protection from unsecured creditors. 268 Profes-
sor Peterson calls his idea “a first priority ‘seed lien’ ” that could be estab-
lished by Congress as a temporary measure. 
 These emergency laws would dramatically improve the housing market in 
several ways. First, cash from the proceeds of a foreclosure could convince 
many defaulting borrowers to turn over their homes without a fight. Many 
economists believe that the economy cannot turn around until the glut of 
foreclosures work their way through the system. Leaving fifteen thousand 
dollars for the family at the finish line would put fuel injectors on this pro-
cess. Since so many mortgage companies cannot seem to find the records to 
 263.  Id . at 45. Professor Riskin believes the “broad” approach is “generally ap-
propriate.”  Id . at 54. 
 264.  Id . at 50. 
 265. Cohen,  Talking It Up, supra note 249, at 6. 
 266.  Id . 
 267. Peterson Testimony,  supra note 205, at 16. 
 268.  Id . 
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foreclose, the value of cooperation from borrowers in cutting through the 
red tape should not be underestimated. 269
 While other worthwhile means of encouraging resolution of the foreclo-
sure crisis, such as use of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 
funds to support foreclosure counseling and mediation, require the use 
of limited public funds, Professor Peterson’s “seed lien” does not. It re-
arranges the priorities for the proceeds from a foreclosure sale in a way 
that allows the departing family to re-establish itself within the community 
with a modicum of dignity. 
 B. MERS, Public Land Records, and State Recording Acts 
 Controversies surrounding MERS have led to questions about the ap-
propriate role of MERS in the housing finance system, particularly with 
respect to the foreclosure process and the public land records system. Pro-
fessor Peterson, in his written testimony to the House Judiciary Commit-
tee discussed  supra , 270 argues that MERS was created by mortgage bankers 
because “they did not want to pay [county] recording fees for assigning 
mortgages anymore.” 271 The desire to create mortgage-backed securities 
was said to be the motivating factor because “[s]ecuritization . . . usually 
required several successive mortgage assignments to different compa-
nies.” 272 Assignments would not have to be recorded if the same company, 
i.e., MERS, “always ‘own[ed]’ all the mortgages.” 273 That aspect of the 
MERS system fell apart as the foreclosure crisis unfolded. A number of 
courts have refused to accept MERS-initiated foreclosures, 274 and investors 
in mortgage-backed securities have threatened to require lenders to repur-
chase such securities because of uncertainties about the ability of MERs 
to sustain foreclosures. 275 MERS subsequently announced that foreclosure 
proceedings no longer may be initiated in its name. 276
 269.  Id . 
 270.  Id.
 271.  Id . at 2, citing Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel NcLaughlin,  Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System , 31  IDAHO L. REV. 805, 810–12 (1995) (“describing an Ernst & 
Young study commissioned by mortgage bankers to study how much money they 
could avoid paying to county governments through the MERS system”). 
 272.  Id . 
 273.  Id . 
 274.  Supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 275. Cohen, “Walk the Talk,”  supra note 249, at 2; Carrie Bay,  Mortgage Fraud 
SARs Jump 31% as Investors Demand Loan Buybacks ,  DSNEWS.COM ( June 28, 2011) 
(reporting that the Federal Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) “attributes the 
increases [in suspicious activity reports (SARs)] to more demands from investors 
for lenders to repurchase poorly performing mortgages, which have prompted ad-
ditional loan reviews”). 
 276. Carrie Bay,  MERS Bows Out of Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Proceedings , 
 DSNEWS ( July 27, 2011),  retrieved from http://www.dsnews.com/articles/print-
view/mers-bows-out-of-foreclosure-proceedings ( July 28, 2011) (discussing MERS 
Policy Bulletin No. 2011-5 ( July 21, 2011). 
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 In his congressional testimony, Professor Peterson offered a number of 
recommendations in response to transparency issues raised by MERS. In an 
effort to persuade lenders and servicers to restore transparency to second-
ary market transactions, he proposed that Congress prohibit the GSEs (Fan-
nie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae) from purchasing “MERS-recorded 
loans.” 277 A similar proposal is contained in the pending Transparency and 
Security in Mortgage Registration Act of 2011. 278 Professor Peterson op-
poses legislation to shield MERS from state commercial and property laws 
by federal preemption of those laws 279 and supports legislation to provide 
“block grants to county governments to upgrade their recording technol-
ogy in return for adopting uniform standards” for recording and searching 
public land records. 280
 Professor Tanya Marsh of Wake Forest Law School argues that “the 
residential foreclosure crisis, and the role of MERS [in that crisis], demon-
strates that the American land title system is broken.” 281 Her ideal system 
would be “a single, national system, but given the political difficulties of 
“dismantle[ing] the local system,” she recommends that the federal govern-
ment establish “an alternative recording system” 282 that includes the follow-
ing features: 
 An ideal system should be organized around some clear principles. It 
should be transparent. It should be easy to search, through dynamic, ro-
bust indexing, and easy to access, preferably through the Internet. Docu-
ments in PDF form should be downloadable. Electronic filing, which has 
been proposed by several scholars and implemented in limited ways, 
should be facilitated. There should be uniformity and consistency in the 
rules governing the form and substance of documents eligible for record-
ing. The system should be public. Establishing and protecting a clear regis-
try of property interests is and should continue to be an essential function 
of government. 283
 Arguing that the “original rationale for a local system has disappeared,” 
but acknowledging the political difficulty of “dismantle[ing] the local 
 277. Peterson Testimony, supra note 205, at 15. 
 278. H.R. 2425, introduced by Rep. Kaptur (D-Ohio), July 6, 2011. The bill was 
referred to the House Committee on Financial Services, but no further action had 
been taken as of April 2, 2012. Thomas (Library Congress website), Bill Summary & 
Status, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011–12),  retrieved from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d112:h.r.2425 (Apr. 2, 2012). 
 279. Peterson Testimony,  supra note 205, at 16. 
 280.  Id . 
 281. Tanya Marsh,  Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording 
System , 111  COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 25 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/
articles/foreclosures-and-the-failure-of-the-american-land-title-recording-system. 
 282.  Id . at 24. 
 283.  Id . 
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system,” Professor Marsh proposes that the federal government create 
an “alternative recording system” to which land records could “migrate” 
under the authority of a uniform state law. Existing records would remain 
in the local offices for historical research purposes, while “an abstract of 
title, along with certified copies of all documents named therein, would 
be added to the federal system.” All subsequent conveyances would be 
recorded in the federal system. 284
 C. Rental Housing Alternatives 
 One of the clear lessons of the foreclosure crisis is that not all households 
have the emotional and financial resources to discharge the responsibili-
ties associated with homeownership. While homeownership is touted as 
the American dream, it is not for everyone during all phases of their adult 
lives. Families that recognize this fact and choose to rent, 285 temporarily 
or permanently, should be applauded for acting responsibly rather than 
stigmatized for failing to contribute to their community. Researchers have 
noted that communities which accept the diversity that comes with offer-
ing a wide choice of housing types, including rental units, tend to be more 
resilient than those which emphasize only one form of housing, such as 
single-family detached houses. 286
 Local governments, particularly in the suburbs, historically have fa-
vored detached single-family housing on relatively large lots through 
their land use regulations. The late Justice Sutherland’s aside that apart-
ments often were “mere parasites” in his 1926 opinion upholding the 
constitutionality of comprehensive zoning 287 had the unfortunate effect 
of contributing to the notion that people who live in apartments do not 
contribute to their communities but rather take from them. But data in-
creasingly showing that the foreclosure crisis extended beyond weak 
urban markets to “distant ‘drive-‘til-you-qualify’ suburbs in strong mar-
ket metros” 288 suggests that more attention needs to be paid to relaxing 
 284.  Id . at 25. A “compromise . . . [that] would be a clear second-best solution” 
would be a state-run system “much like the registration system used for Article 9 
fi lings under the Uniform Commercial Code,” something that Iowa has established. 
Id. , citing Iowa Land Records, at https://iowalandrecords.org. 
 285. Anecdotal evidence suggests that families are paying more attention to the 
longer-term implications of purchasing a home. Jim Gallagher,  Shelter from Recession: 
Rental Market Does OK ,  ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2010, at A1 (reporting that 
a young couple chose to rent a house rather than buy it because they were unsure 
about the future of the housing market and their economic prospects). 
 286. Todd Swanstrom,  Resilience in the Face of Foreclosure: How National Actors 
Shape Local Responses, in  URBAN AND REGIONAL POLICYAND ITS EFFECTS (Margaret Weir 
et al. eds.) (Brookings Inst. 2012). 
 287. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (“that in [de-
tached house] sections very often the apartment is a mere parasite”). 
 288. Swanstrom,  supra note 286. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2056411
68   Journal of Affordable Housing  Volume 21, Number 1
the suburban bias against multi-family housing that has endured since 
the 1920s. 
 The foreclosure crisis did not create the need for greater acceptance of 
rental housing; it merely added to an existing need created by changing 
demographics and housing choices. Arthur Nelson, professor of city and 
regional planning at the University of Utah, reported in February 2007, 
more than a year before the housing collapse, that the United States had an 
excessive number of large houses on large lots, and that the greatest need 
in the next quarter-century will be for rental and small-lot single-family 
housing types. 289
 Four years later he updated his analysis with a Power Point presentation 
he dubbed, “The Decade of Calamity: Demographic and Economic Driv-
ers to 2020.” 290 Anticipating an expected growth in the U.S. population of 
33 million persons by 2020, he repeated his prediction that rental housing 
will be in the greatest demand in the next decade. The two largest cohorts 
seeking housing in this decade will be new households without children 
and senior citizens, both of which “lean toward multifamily and away from 
large-lot sprawl.” 291 He also predicted that “many McMansions on the sub-
urban fringe would be retrofitted as multifamily housing (2–3 units) and 
offered as rentals, co-ops or condominiums.” 292 In Nelson’s opinion, the 
country has “overbuilt by 5.3 million housing units.” 293 Anticipated tighter 
rules for mortgage financing 294 will make homeownership more difficult 
 289. New Urban Network, Market for Smart Growth Stronger,  NEW URB. NEWS , 
Mar. 1, 2007, http://newurbannetwork.com/article/market-smart-growth-stron
ger (reporting on presentation by Arthur C. Nelson at New Partners for Smart 
Growth conference, February 8-10, 2007). 
 290. Robert Steuteville,  The Coming Housing Calamity ,  NEW URB. NETWORK , 
Apr. 28, 2011, http://newurbannetwork.com/news-opinion/blogs/robert-steu
teville/14620/coming-housin . . . (discussing Arthur Nelson’s presentation at the 
Journalists Forum on Land and the Built Environment, jointly sponsored by 
the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the Harvard Graduate School of Design, and the 
Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, Apr. 15–16, 2011). 
 291.  Id . 
 292.  Id . 
 293.  Id . 
 294. Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act requires federal banking, housing, and securities agencies to “jointly pre-
scribe regulations” requiring securitizers to “retain an economic interest in a portion 
of the credit risk [defi ned as not less than 5 percent of the credit risk]” of a residential 
mortgage asset transferred to a third party. § 941(b), adding new § 15G to the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.), 124 Stat. 1890–1891 ( July 21, 
2010). Proposed rules were issued April 29, 2011. Credit Risk Retention Proposed 
Rules, 76 Fed. Reg. 24090 (Apr. 29, 2011). 
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for lower-income households. All of which adds up to a much stronger de-
mand for rental housing, perhaps exceeding 41 percent of the total housing 
market by 2020, Nelson believes. 295
 American families that have suffered foreclosure apparently have come 
to the same conclusion as they reportedly have sought rental property five 
times as often as other forms of housing. 296 And the Obama administration 
was reported to be looking into the possibility of making foreclosed single-
family houses available for rent as a way to help ease the glut of houses on 
the market. 297
 The framework for a collaborative approach to creating more diverse 
housing opportunities is in place with creation of the National Housing 
Trust Fund (NHTF) in 2008. 298 Though funding has been delayed because 
of the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the increasing con-
cern of Congress about the size of the federal deficit, new regulations 
proposed by HUD link the NHTF to the HOME block grant program, 
described by HUD as “the largest federal block grant program that pro-
duces affordable housing for [very low-income] households.” 299 Funds 
would flow to states and cities through a “formula allocation” system 
that has been in place since 1992. While homeownership programs may 
be supported with trust fund monies, the statute and proposed regula-
tions require at least 90 percent of annual grants to be used for rental 
housing production, particularly for persons in the lowest income 
quartile. 300
 Use of formula grants in the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, the 
federal government’s initial response to the foreclosure crisis, has been 
criticized as “[s]preading the funds around” and thus “[shrinking] the 
 295. Robert Steuteville,  Housing: An Irresistible Force Meets an Immovable Object , 
 NEW URB. NETWORK , Apr. 29, 2011, http://newurbannetwork.com/news-opinion/
blogs/robert-steuteville/14629/housing-irresis . . . (reporting Nelson’s analysis of 
the potential demand for rental housing and transit-oriented development). 
 296. Zelman & Assocs.,  Finding Foreclosure Victims: Majority in Single-Family 
Rentals, Fueling Investor Interest (Sept. 27, 2011), https://www.zelmanassociates.
com/IR_Apart_09262011.pdf. 
 297. Nick Timiraos,  Government Considers Ways to Rent Foreclosed Homes ,  WALL
ST. J. , July 22, 2011. In 2012, private equity fi rms and other investors began buying 
large quantities of homes vacated as a result of foreclosure in order to rent them in 
the hopes of making large profi ts. Motoko Rich,  Buying Homes by the Thousands: In-
vestors Aim to Stockpile Fixer-Uppers to Fill with Tenants ,  N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 3, 2012, at B1. 
 298. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub.L. No. 110-289, 
§ 1131, adding new § 1338 to the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and 
Soundness Act of 1992, 12 U.S.C. § 4501 & ff. (2006). 
 299. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Trust Fund, Proposed 
Rule, 24 C.F.R., Part 92, Subpart N, 75 Fed. Reg. 66979, Oct. 29, 2010. 
 300. HERA § 1338(c)(7)(B), 1338(c)(10)(A); Proposed Rule,  supra note 299, at 
66993, § 92.730(a)(1). 
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 opportunity space for neighborhood stabilization by impeding the ability 
of local actors to tailor the program to local conditions.” 301 But while that 
“so-called peanut-butter approach” 302 risks a similar watering-down effect 
for the NHTF, it provides a mechanism, as well as potential political cover, 
for local officials to encourage greater acceptance of rental housing in com-
munities that have resisted such housing. 
 Conclusion 
 The outline of a national foreclosure response strategy is emerging. 
The NFMC counseling program has reached hundreds of thousands of 
stressed borrowers and is growing in scope. Mandatory loss mitigation 
and automatic foreclosure mediation procedures have been successful in 
helping families remain in their homes when that is a realistic goal and 
have helped other families find alternatives that permit them to get on with 
their lives. The National Mortgage Settlement recognizes the validity of 
loss mitigation techniques. Professor Peterson’s “first priority ‘seed lien,’ ” 
which reverses the normal priority of claims to foreclosure sale proceeds, 
can cushion the re-entry process for families losing their homes. Greater 
acceptance of, and support for, rental housing in all residential neighbor-
hoods can strengthen neighborhood resilience while offering decent hous-
ing opportunities to people who have lost their homes through foreclosure, 
or who find homeownership an unrealistic prospect at a particular stage 
of their lives. Fully funding the NHTF will provide an important financial 
resource for affordable rental housing development. 
 As the country picks up the pieces of the foreclosure debacle, important 
questions of federal policy remain to be answered. What is the future of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? Does the state-administered foreclosure sys-
tem need to be revised? Should that system be nationalized? Does MERS 
serve a useful purpose, or should it be scrapped in favor of a revitalized 
public land records system? 303 If MERS is to play a meaningful role going 
forward, it must recognize and embrace the public trust aspect of its busi-
ness. Answers to these questions, while currently being debated, must wait 
 301. Swanstrom,  supra note 286. 
 302.  Id . 
 303. Two commentators recently made the argument that “[l]and records should 
be available as a repository of copies not only of mortgages, but of their underlying 
promissory notes with legal incentives to the recording of both so as to eliminate 
the problem of lost paper,” coupled with “a statewide system of uniform multiple 
electronic indexing input from transactional attorneys’ desks.” Adam Leitman Bai-
ley & DovTreiman,  Moving Beyond the Mistakes of MERS to Have A Secure and Profi t-
able National Title System , 29:4 ACREL  NEWS at 5, 13–14 (Dec. 2011) (published by 
the American College of Real Estate Lawyers),  retrieved from www.acrel.org/Docu-
ments/Newsletters/Dec2011.pdf (Apr. 5, 2012). 
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the resolution of the current crisis. The housing market must get back on 
its feet first in order for housing to resume its role as part of the American 
dream. The National Mortgage Settlement is a good first step. But it is only 
a first step. Implementation will be crucial. Institutionalization of the loss 
mitigation provisions in an effective manner can help restore buyer and 
lender confidence in the housing market. 
 Perhaps the wisest course would be to re-emphasize the definition of 
housing as a source of shelter, family security, and community identifica-
tion, as promulgated by the Douglas Commission in 1969. Rental housing 
can serve those purposes along with homeownership. Reckless speculation 
in housing market appreciation should not be a part of that vision. 
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